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Foreword 
As we enter a new millennium, many nations are striving to acquire advanced 
weapons of war. Since the 1980s, the most favored symbols and instruments of 
power among lesser powers have been theater ballistic missiles. In concert with 
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons of mass destruction, theater ballistic 
missile systems present a challenge to American military forces, threatening 
three vital centers of gravity: the forces themselves, the unity and resolve of 
potential regional partners and allies, and the political will of the United States 
to exercise a military option. 
In the next decade, sea-based ballistic missile defense will offer joint power 
projection forces a vital, flexible, and increasingly robust theater defense 
capability. Weapon and sensor development; communications, computers, and 
intelligence architectures; and battle management command and control issues 
are all being addressed with vigor-a measure of the gravity of this evolving and 
imminent threat. 
However, defensive power from the sea emerges from a unique and complex 
arena, where combat takes place in three dimensions against many dissimilar 
threats, in three overlapping and competing environments which, by their very 
nature, cause conflicting tasking of limited assets. Therefore, the promise of naval 
theater ballistic missile defense must be studied with this operational complexity 
in mind. 
In this Newport Paper, which or iginated as an Advanced Research Project in 
the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, Commander 
Swicker proposes that naval theater ballistic missile defense can realize its full 
potential only if the Maritime Component Commander understands and 
addresses the key issues involved in its operational employment. I urge all 
involved in conceptualizing, planning, and executing naval surface warfare to 
take heed of his deep and discerning examination, which provides valuable 
insights and encourages us to address the full range of possibilities for, and 
requirements upon, tomorrow's naval theater ballistic missile defense. 
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy 
President, Naval War College 
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Introduction 
A sense of urgency informs Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues 
for the Maritime Component Commander. Theater ballistic missiles armed with 
chemical, biological, or nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will be 
acquired and deployed by hostile forces in the developing world, posing an 
imminent threat to the us. and coalition forces that must operate in that world. 
The gravity of this evolving threat is recognized in our national military strategy. 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) 
systems are also evolving, but with the exception of the Patriot PAC-2 missile 
system, none are yet fielded. Recognizing this constraint, this study looks ten 
years ahead, to 200S, toward the challenge of joint and multinational power 
projection operations against a TBM-WMD armed adversary. In such a regional 
contingency, the first TBMD-capable forces on the scene are likely to be naval. It 
will thus be the duty of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander to 
plan, fight, and win the initial TBMD battle in order to enable the introduction 
of follow-on TBMD forces from the other Service components, as the campaign 
moves inland from the littoral. 
This study's particular value lies in the attention it invites towards issues that 
concern the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander in his 
responsibility to perform the essential enabling task of delivering TBMD from 
the sea. To this end, I spent the summer of 1995 reviewing the current literature, 
followed by research trips to several key "nodes" within the naval and joint 
theater ballistic missile defense communities. These visits included Naval 
Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division; the Program Executive Office, 
T heater Air Defense (PEO TAD-B); the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization; 
and the office of the Navy's Director for Theater Air Warfare (NS65). This 
initial effort led to my further travel as an observer for the TBMD Wargame 95B 
held at the National Test Facility, Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, in 
September, and finally to a personal project briefing for Rear Admiral Rodney 
Rempt (then NS65) at Newport, Rhode Island, in October. 
This five-chapter, unclassified study is designed to raise more questions than it 
answers. With that purpose in mind, expeditious accessibility and wide 
dissemination are essential to facilitate further research-thus the specific intent 
to remain unclassified. The properly cleared reader, however, is encouraged to 
pursue potential areas of further inquiry at any appropriate level of classification, 
using the more than seventy military and non-military sources in the 
bibliography as points of departure. 
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Chapter I details the purpose of the study as well as its enabling assumptions. 
The specifics of future conflict and the actual capabilities of yet-to-be-fielded 
systems cannot be determined in advance. This paper, however, is not devoted to 
an in-depth examination of specific technical issues-and indeed cannot be, due 
to both its unclassified nature and, more importantly, the inability to discuss in 
detail that which is still being developed. The intent is to examine, at the level of 
the flag officer serving as the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 
OFMCC), the impliCfJtions of these capabilities and the difficult issues to which 
they will give rise in the future. To discuss these issues in a meaningful manner , 
certain capabilities and conditions must be assumed. 
Chapter II provides the reader with a brief overview of the TBM-WMD 
threat that will face US. forces in the near term and into the future. Current 
active defense capabilities against that threat are explained, as are the potential 
consequences of any diminution ofTBMD research and development in the face 
of continuing budgetary constraints. The chapter concludes with a survey of 
projected US. naval theater ballistic missile defense capabilities to the year 2008. 
The central portion of the study, chapter III, establishes a set of first principles 
that enables the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander facing a 
TBM-WMD threat to focus his attention. Each of the four areas of 
concentration-Logistics; Command, Control, and Intelligence; Warfighting; 
and Rules of Engagement-is examined to place the operational challenge of 
theater ballistic missile defense within the multimission complexity of mar itime 
warfare in a littoral theater. 
Successfully performed, TBMD is unlikely to remain a purely naval mission. 
Indeed, the vital nature of naval TBMD is to enable complementary Army and 
Air Force systems to enter the theater and contribute to the battle. According to 
the National Military Strategy, allied and coalition assets will also be, whenever 
possible, an integral part of such a US. effort. Chapter IV examines potential 
joint and multinational contributions to the campaign's overall TBMD 
operations. 
Finally, chapter V summarizes the study by considering the essential nature of 
theater ballistic missile defense through specific defining characteristics derived 
from the preceding sections. These essential TBMD "themes" are: 
• The challenge of conflicting missions and limited means. 
• The reality of hard choices. 
• The fact that theater ballistic missile defense is one mission enabling many , 
rather than an end in itself. 
xii 
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The pervasive impact of these themes on both theater ballistic missile defense 
forces and the officers who control and direct these forces is examined to 
illustrate that TBMD is an enabling capability. 
Given the likelihood of a dispersed, Theater Wide TBMD battle, the 
challenge of logistics illustrates the value of a straightfor ward operations analysis 
approach to the vital discussion of fuel and vertical launch system rearming-a 
discussion which reveals the true complexity of war in the littoral, where the 
TBMD mission will not exist in isolation. 
The area of command, control, and intelligence considers that same 
complexity at three different levels: above the ]FMCC at the NCA level; among 
competing component commanders at the theater level; and from the ]FMCC 
down to the unit leveL Significant operational friction is held to exist at every 
level: political versus military objectives up the chain of command; mission 
versus mission at the theater level; and effective decentralized control versus 
efficient centralized control of TBMD engagements down the chain. 
Encompassing them all, comprehensive intelligence preparation of the battle 
space is essential to the ]FMCC's mastery of the TBMD mission's subtleties and 
thus his ability to make the hard choices necessary for effective execution. 
Warfighting specifies some of the hard choices that will face the ]FMCC 
owing to his own logistical limitations and the operational priorities of his 
superiors. The logistically competing but operationally complementary natures 
of Navy Theater Wide (upper tier) capability and Navy Area Oower tier) are 
considered. This discussion illustrates the vast potential defensive leverage of 
upper-tier systems as well as the essential requirement for lower-tier systems in 
the conduct of amphibious power projection. 
The vital issues of national policy and inter national law which must inform 
US. theater ballistic missile defense operations are presented under the rubric of 
Rules of Engagement. The confluence of political constraints on US. actions 
and the tactical challenges posed by the speed and lethality of enemy 
TBM-WMD systems will likely result in two trends: Defensive TBMD ROE (i.e., 
engaging incoming TBMs) will become increasingly permissive, while offensive 
TBMD ROE (i .e., Attack Operations-"Scud-hunting") will remain centrally 
controlled and highly restrictive. The ]FMCC and his subordinate commanders 
must be able to operate effectively within the bounds of this dichotomy. 
The conundrum posed by conflicting missions that must be executed within 
limited means affects the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander's every 
decision when confronting the TBM-WMD challenge. A clear grasp of his 
superiors' operational intent will allow an initial triage of missions, sorting out 
what must be done now from what can wait; but even then the tyranny of 
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numbers and the challenge of distance may force assets to be apportioned more 
thinly than doctrine demands. 
Conducting operations while facing a TBM-WMD threat will require that 
the JFMCC make hard choices. These decisions will be all-encompassing and 
continuous, part of an iterative process of evaluating mission priority, unit 
tasking, tautness of command and control, degree of political constraint, and the 
impact of the NCA's overall intent on the TBMD rules of engagement that are in 
place. Making these difficult choices in a timely, forthright manner and, 
whenever possible, in accordance with Joint TBMD doctrine, will help ensure a 
smooth transition of the TBMD fight when the campaign begins to move inland 
from the littoral. 
Such a transition will have been made possible only through a successful 
TBMD battle waged by the maritime component "holding open the door" for 
follow-on TBMD forces deploying into the theater thus defended. This 
capability cannot be considered in isolation. Theater ballistic missile defense in 
general, and TBMD delivered from the sea in particular, is the means that enables 
the successful conduct of other operations in the face of the TBM threat. 
This study presents a preliminary analysis of the many inherent and 
unavoidable complexities of TBMD conducted from the sea. As present and 
future commanders envision this mission and prepare the Navy to meet its 
challenges, they should recognize that, however important TBMD certainly will 
become, it will be a supporting and enabling function for other naval and joint 
operations. Most importantly, they should find the principal lessons of this study 
illuminating, realistic, and deserving of additional detailed investigation. 
XIV 
I 
Assutnptions for Discussion 
THE u.s. NAVAL THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, tasked against the threat of ballistic missiles that may be armed with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) , will be one of the new, key military capabilities deployed in 
support of joint operations over the next ten years. Technical development issues 
and doctrinal command and control questions are gradually being resolved as 
near-term systems approach initial operational capability. As with many new 
military capabilities, programs and studies tend to focus on discrete areas rather 
than on an integrating overview of flag-level concerns affecting operational 
naval TBMD. This paper addresses that need by examining the issues that the 
Joint Force Maritime Component Commander may need to consider when 
operating against a TBM-WMD threat. 
The intended approach of this study is straightforward, written by a serving 
surface line officer with extensive AEGIS experience. The assumptions that 
inform the remainder of the study are detailed immediately to avoid the loss of 
credibility by a reader who encounters "emergent assumptions" down the line. 
The nature of the missile and WMD proliferation threat and the worldwide 
dynamics that drive it provide a background in the nature of the TBMD 
challenge, now and into the future. The basic tenets of Joint TBMD are set forth, 
and the current baseline capabilities to respond to the threat are examined along 
with an overview of naval active defense TBMD capabilities as currently 
projected to 2008. 
Chapter III is the heart of this study. In logical progression, it sorts and sets forth 
those critical issues to which the Joint Force Maritime Component 
Commander must pay personal attention when tasked to operate against a 
TBM-WMD threat. Quite simply: what questions will keep him awake at night, 
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and how might he possibly address them? Much like a Defense Support 
Program (DSP) satellite will soon cue a TBMD AEGIS cruiser, the intended 
purpose of this study is to detect and pass on the nature and parameters of the 
problem, not to consummate the intercept and solve that problem. Too much is 
yet uncertain; too much is still evolving. This paper is successful if it illustrates 
the scope and direction of that evolution, thereby providing a sound intellectual 
basis for dealing with uncertainty. 
An Unprecedented Challenge 
Theater ballistic missiles transcend the accepted boundaries of conventional 
warfare. In speed and altitude, they exceed the envelope of conventional Air 
Warfare (AW) defenses. In range, they may cross AOR boundaries of 
geographic CINCs, thus exceeding the "envelope" of traditional in-theater 
command and control. When armed with weapons of mass destruction or 
targeted against population centers, the asymmetric political leverage they 
potentially provide to otherwise impotent aggressors is a new and profoundly 
unsettling phenomenon. The military response to such unprecedented 
capability must inevitably be joint. 
In an era of reduced U.S. presence overseas, the first American theater ballistic 
missile defense capability on the scene of a developing crisis is likely to come 
from the sea-but it will be enabled, supported, and eve ntually reinforced by the 
complementary capabilities of all branches and possibly bolstered by the 
synergistic contributions of allies and coalition partners. The ability of these 
forces to stand firm, build up, and wrest the initiative from hostile forces either 
diplomatically or operationally may well rest on the ability of the Joint Force 
Maritime Component Commander to execute the theater ballistic missile 
defense mission, not in isolation, but in the midst of the messy complexity of 
multimission warfare in the littoral. 
Bounding the Problem. The current state of ferment in the TMD/TBMD arena 
is the sure sign of a dynamic challenge dynamically addressed. Different 
concepts, architectures, and systems compete for funding and patronage in an 
evolutionary process that will eventually produce coherent doctrine and 
capable hardware. However, in order to examine the theater ballistic missile 
defense issues of concern to the Joint Force Maritime Component 
Commander in 2008, the problem must be bounded. The following 
assumptions do so: 
2 
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea 
• This study is primarily concerned with the active defense capability of 
naval theater ballistic missile defenses under the command of a Joint Force 
Maritime Component Commander in a littoral theater in 2008. 
• In 2008, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will have 
available Navy Area TBMD capability, using the SM2 Block IV A interceptor. 
• Navy Theater Wide (NTW) capability also will be operational in the form 
of the SM3 exoatmospheric interceptor. 
• All Navy TBMD interceptors will be launched by AEGIS combatants. 
• The projected basic theater ballistic missile defense BMC4I (battle 
management command, control, communications, computers, and 
intelligence) architecture of a joint planning network QPN), joint data 
network QDN), and joint composite tracking network QCTN) will have 
been implemented. These new networks will be based on current 
initiatives: the global command and control system (GCCS) and the joint 
maritime command information system QMCIS) for the ]PN; the joint 
tactical information distribution system QTIDS/ LINK 16) for the ]DN; 
cooperative engagement capability (CEC) for the ]CTN.1 
• Stereo defense support program (DSP) satellite TBM launch-cueing 
information of the type now received and processed by the joint tactical 
ground station QTAGS) will be available on board AEGIS combatants. 
• SBIRS-LOW, the space-based infrared system-low earth orbit component 
of the space and missile tracking system SMTS (derived from the SDIO 
Brilliant Eyes concept) will not yet be operational2 
As theater ballistic missile defense concepts continue to evolve, common 
themes emerge from otherwise disparate documents. It is assumed that by 2008, 
some of these themes will be fully accepted as tenets of joint theater ballistic 
missile defense doctrine, to include: 
• The keystone of effective theater ballistic missile defense is centralized 
planning with coordinated, decentralized executlOn.3 
• Theater ballistic missile defense is considered a subset of theater missile 
defense (TMD), and thus of theater air defense (TAD), rather than a 
separate mission. 
• Within the joint TAD chain-of-command, the Area Air Defense 
commander (AADC) is responsible for TBMD active defense, while the 
Joint Force Air Component Commander OFACC) is responsible for 
TBMD attack operations (offensive operations directed against TBM 
launchers, C2 nodes, and support infrastructure). 
3 
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Operational Assumptions. Finally, this study examines what is asswned to be the 
most challenging kind of operational contingency envisioned for a U.S. Joint 
Force Maritime Component Commander: 
• An emergent crisis in 2008 involving an undeveloped theater, facing a 
littoral opponent from the developing world who possesses multiple 
WMD-capable TBM systems. 
• This WMD threat includes a baseline weaponized (20kt fission/single 
reentry vehicle-per-TBM) nuclear capability. 
• Some enemy TBM systems have sufficient range to hold the capitals and 
major population centers of possible U.S. regional coalition partners at 
risk. 
• Potential regional allies have no organic TBMD capability. However, 
some of their T ACAIR, SOF, and C2 assets could contribute to 
multinational attack operations, and their naval forces could contribute to 
non-TBMD maritime tasking. 
• US. ground-based TBMD systems are not forward deployed in the 
region, and the ports and airfields through which they will be delivered 
are currently undefended against TBM attack. Once the ports and airfields 
are secure, US. Army THAAD (theater high altitude area defense) and 
Patriot PAC-3 (ERINT) will be available. MEADS, the mediwn extended 
air defense system (formerly known as CORPS SAM), entangled in 
budgetary infighting since the mid-1990s, is not yet available. 
• Air Force wide-body transport (B747) airborne laser (ABL) platforms are 
operational, but have not yet been deployed to the as-yet undefended 
airfields in theater. 
• The Joint Force Commander views amphibious power projection as an 
option in his concept of operations (CONOPS). Several potential 
amphibious objective areas are under consideration. 
• Enemy short-range missile capabilities (SS-21, FROG-7, SMERCH 
multiple launch rocket system) are robust , as are his littoral defense 
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), mine warfare capabilities (MIW), diesel 
submarine and fast patrol boat forces. On paper, his air order of battle is 
impressive, but his level of pilot training and quality of aircraft 
maintenance are questionable. His air arm has never faced an opponent 
possessing US.-Ievel proficiency. 
While other kinds of situations are expected to arise, the above conditions are 
regarded as the most stressing while remaining within the time frame of the next 
decade. 
4 
Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Overview 
As THE NEW MILLENNIUM APPROACHES, the United States looks out on a world in ferment-nations and peoples attempting to define their place 
in an international order shattered by the end of nearly three generations under a 
bipolar system. Pessimists preach a dark future: "Technology is changing how man 
knows, and the resulting dislocations are culturally cataclysmic. Half the world is 
looking for God anew, and the other half is behaving as if no god exists.,,4 Optimists 
couch their views in terms reflecting the dichotomy within the common Chinese 
character for chaos and opportunity. "We live at a fantastic moment of human 
history ... The spread of the Third Wave economy has galvanized all of the Asia 
Pacific region, introducing trade and strategic tensions, but at the same time opening 
the possibility of rapidJy raising a billion human beings out of the pit of povetty."s 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff take the middle ground and see "a world in which 
threats are widespread and uncertain, and where conflict is probable, but too 
often unpredictable.,,6 To the ]CS, that world holds four principal dangers for the 
United States: 
• Regional instability 
• The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
• Transnational dangers [e.g. terrorism, drugs], and 
7 • Dangers to democracy and reform. 
Threat, Vulnerability, and Defense 
These four challenges are intertwined in a dynamic that is emerging from 
the confluence of international instability and the worldwide diffusion of 
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technology. As more and more nations consider themselves to be standing alone 
before their enemies, no longer sheltered by the suzerainty of a superpower, they 
also are increasingly able to buy, steal, or indigenously develop the technologies 
through which they hope to "achieve strategic security-the chance of a 
millennium."s Often, these striving nations believe that this chance is to be 
found in the complementary technologies and synergistic power of theater 
ballistic missiles and the second "principal danger"-weapons of mass 
destruction. 
TBM and WMD Proliferation. Evolution, whether of organisms or 
organizations, arises from the selective pressure exerted by the surrounding 
environment and will continue for the duration of that pressure. The selective 
pressure of the international environment may drive the leaders of developing 
nations to acquire theater ballistic missiles as a means to achieve strategic 
security, both for their people and for themselves. This is the vital, indeed primal, 
"demand side" of the proliferation equation. W hy nations who otherwise lack 
significant political or military leverage wish to acquire such disproportionate 
capabilities is often more important than how they achieve that goal. In a world 
of increasingly decentralized technology and an ever-expanding base of 
scientific knowledge, these nations will succeed. Unless the pressure for nations 
to assure their own strategic security can be eliminated, supply-side controls on 
proliferation are doomed to eventual failure. Determined proliferators will arm 
themselves before they will feed their people. For example: 
The Iraqi government has used a covert network of purchasing agents and dummy 
companies to buy millions of dollars worth of sensitive missile parts from firms in 
Europe and Russia .... The missile-related orders reflect Iraq's willingness to spend 
tens of millions of dollars to rebuild a key facet of its prewar military capability, 
even though the country's leaders claim it is financially strapped: 
Consider what Third-World nations stand to gain from such decisions. These 
weapons confer national prestige upon a regime and its leader; they allow 
formidable international intimidation of regional foes; and they are available on 
the world arms market as turnkey systems with required training levels that are 
achievable in the developing world. 
No longer the exclusive Cold War preserve of Nato and the Warsaw Pact, 
TBMs have been successfully employed in tribal civil wars in Mghanistan and 
Yemen, proving that neither a national technical infrastructure nor a highly 
trained tactical air arm is necessary to strike quickly and deeply at an enemy's key 
military and political targets.10 Even against a nation with modern, well-trained 
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forces, unless capable theater ballistic missile defenses are fielded, such strikes will 
get through, expending replaceable TBM "ammunition" rather than valuable 
TACAIR pilots. 11 
By 2008, more than twenty countries will be able to field some form ofTBM 
capability, including key regional powers in the £lash points of northeast Asia, the 
South China Sea littoral, the Indian subcontinent, southwest Asia, the Levant, 
and North Mrica. International efforts to counter TBM proliferation, including 
such Western supply-side "technology cartels" as the missile technology control 
regime (MTCR) , may increasingly push these same nations toward the 
development of indigenous technology. 
The nature of indigenous technology in the Third World will tend to limit 
missile accuracy more than it will warhead lethality In this regard, the 
intelligence community will have to closely monitor emergent TBM 
applications of global positioning system (CPS) technology. In general, however, 
the precise guidance systems necessary to achieve a small circular error probable 
(CEP) with a ballistic system are, simply, more difficult to design and 
manufacture than are, for example, basic chemical warheads for that same system. 
This "selective pressure" will thus encourage the evolution of systems with poor 
accuracy but powerful payloads. 
Historically, the targets of choice for systems thus constrained have been 
civilian population centers-large, soft, stationary targets of dubious military 
value but of great political importance. Therefore, these systems may not be able 
to defeat a developed nation militarily, but they can confer potent political 
leverage through the threat, as French strategic planners once put it, of "tearing 
off an arm." 
Readiness to exercise that option, though, may not be constrained by 
traditional concepts of strategic deterrence. Speaking specifically of small 
nuclear forces in the developing world, Jerome Kahan identifies three factors 
which increase the likelihood of use for any form ofWMD: 
Strategic discourse between . .  adversaries may be nonexistent, raising the 
prospect of a breakdown in deterrence at the regional level. . . 
Third World states tend to have imperfect and incomplete intelligence in­
formation about their relative positions in a conflict .... 
Small nuclear forces, especially in the hands of technically unsophisticated 
cOUfltries, may well be deficient in command and control arrangements. 12 
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Thus, by 2008, the United States may face a variety of regional powers 
deploying tenuously controlled TBM systems of prodigious reach with 
problematic accuracy offset by powerful warheads. 
Why, in a discussion of theater ballistic missile defense, should weapons of 
mass destruction, especially nuclear WMD, be emphasized when these devices 
have yet to be combined with TBMs and used in regional conflict? The 
"leverage" inherent in a given weapon system derives, in part, from how 
effectively it can engage and neutralize its intended target. During Operation 
DESERT STORM, the United States gained great leverage from the 
conventionally armed Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM), successfully 
conducting operational fires with this weapon, to the full depth of the theater, in 
the critical early days of the war. That leverage was gained by what was, in effect, 
nothing more than a slow-flying 1 ,OOO-lb. bomb. However, TLAM was in reality 
a "system of systems;' a weapon whose nominal power was multiplied by precise 
accuracy gained from complex guidance systems, systems in turn supported by 
an unrivalled National Technical Intelligence system, a comprehensive 
Mapping, Charting and Geodesy system, and a mission-planning system 
employing a national network of experts with access to massive computational 
power. All the missile had to do was fly to a given point in three dimensions and 
explode-but the synergistic support systems that planned the mission for that 
one missile had marked and mensurated that point to within inches. 
In developing nations, these support systems are generally missing. National 
technical intelligence with which to conduct strategic reconnaissance is limited 
or nonexistent (as noted by Kahan). In a permissive pre hostilities environment, 
an intelligence operative with a hand-held GPS can record the coordinates of a 
stationary target, but the TBM system tasked against that target is unlikely to be 
able to take advantage of the precision thus provided. Though enhanced ballistic 
missile systems that approach U.S. cruise missile accuracy will someday be 
fielded, supply-side proliferation controls and the resultant limitations of 
indigenous technology will tend to push that day into the future. Thus, while 
First World land attack cruise missiles gain their leverage through stealth and 
accuracy derived from a system of systems, Third World theater ballistic missiles 
stand alone and must rely on speed and brute force. 
The solution for poor targeting of denied areas and poor system accuracy 
once a TBM gets there is to increase warhead lethality. As long as accuracy 
remains constrained, this is an evolutionary imperative for TBM systems and 
therefore represents an imminent threat for TBMD forces. In 1991, crude 
chemical warheads were available for Iraqi Scuds, but were not used. In 2008, 
TBM-weaponized WMD could include bulk chemical and biologic warheads, 
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chemical submunitions, and that most challenging threat of all-the 
TBM-carried nuclear weapon. 
Much debate currently swirls about the defensive difficulties posed by var ious 
incarnations of putative chemical sub munition warheads. The sound and fury of 
these cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) arguments tend to push 
the reality of the nuclear threat into an indeterminate future scenario. Modern 
chemical weapons are indeed deadly, and it is possible to design a worst-case 
submunition warhead to carry them, which wilJ give TBMD interceptor 
engineers cold sweats-but an important fact gets lost in the debate. Chemicals 
and bioagents kill. Nuclear weapons obliterate. 
Since August 1945, nuclear weapons have had a special resonance in world 
affairs, unmatched by the other two members of the WMD unholy trinity. The 
use of chemical weapons in recent conflicts has been universally decried-and, 
in those cases, universally tolerated. One wonders what the world community 
would have done if the final offensives of the Iran-Iraq war had been heralded by 
tactical nuclear exchanges rather than by the muffied midnight bursts of mustard 
and cyanide shells. Likewise, had the Libyan CW plant at Rabta actually been 
producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), might it not have disappeared under 
a swarm of TLAM long before the hardened facility at Tarhuna was built? 
Also, note that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) draft 
Theater Missile Defense Command and Control Plan contains a nuclear-not a 
biological, not a chemical-annex, for nuclear weapons attack everything 
simultaneously, burning, blasting, poisoning, and causing the C2-vital 
electromagnetic spectrum to fibrillate even as they turn the very sand to ash and 
glass. 
Proliferators in the developing world know this. Chemical and biological 
weapons are more easily produced-but they are the B-Team. A-Team 
capability is available for a sufficient investment of time and treasure. Israel, India, 
Pakistan, South Mrica, and North Korea know this. It is hoped that before the 
murder of Hussein Kamel al-Majid in March 1996, the intelligence community 
interrogated the Iraqi inner-circle defector and WMD-development chief 
concerning the details of the Iraqi nuclear program in early 1991-thereby 
suggesting how the similar Iranian program may be progressing today. "The 
Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons technology mirrors the push by 
President Saddam Hussein to build a nuclear bomb in Iraq over the last 15 years. 
The Iranians use many of the old Iraqi smuggling routes and contacts . ... ,,\3 Both 
in the Gulf and beyond, the TBM-WMD threat is imminent. By expedience and 
necessity, that threat in the short term will be chemical and biological. By 
evolutionary imperative, the threat in the future will be nuclear. 
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Three Centers of Gravity. WMD capability will give theater ballistic missiles a 
degree of leverage they have not heretofore demonstrated. Conventional Scuds 
arcing into Haifa and Tel Aviv presented the United States with a severe, but 
ultimately manageable, operational and diplomatic challenge. The same could 
not have been said if the Scuds had been carrying weapons of mass destruction. 
WMD-capable TBMs will be able to hold at risk not only specific individual 
targets, but entire centers of gravity, both military and political. 
At the operational-tactical level of conflict, an enemy so equipped can 
threaten the military center of gravity consisting of the opposing power 
projection force itself. One way of doing this would be to interdict ports, 
airfields, supply depots, and fixed assembly areas.14 Aggressor forces employed 
chemical TBM barrages against just this target set early in the northeast Asia 
MRC of Global Wargame '95.15 Using conventional TBMs, the Iraqi military 
attempted the same tactic, for the same reasons, against rear areas such as Jubayl, 
Saudi Arabia, in 1991.16 These conventional attacks were largely ineffective. 
However, were a credible chemical, biological, or nuclear threat posed, it 
probably would force the assembly, concentration, and resupply of a power 
projection force to take place outside the range of hostile TBM systems; such a 
threat-induced operational requirement would make the movement-to-contact 
phase of a major campaign significantly more complex and costly. 
Also at the operational-tactical level of conflict, a second way of attacking the 
military center of gravity is to use the TBM-WMD system against concentrated 
formations of combat forces. Hence, the DESERT STORM model of massive 
force marshaled, magnified, then suddenly unleashed in high tempo, 
synchronized combat probably will be difficult to emulate. Heavy ground forces 
concentrating in fixed assembly areas in theater would likely be superseded by 
more maneuverable (thus more survivable, albeit lighter) forces deployed from 
longer range-perhaps by means of an extended period of air and naval str ike 
tasking, followed by airborne and amphibious operations that would themselves 
attempt to minimize their suitability as targets for WMD. 
At the operational level of war, the WMD-TBM vulnerable center of gravity is 
political: the cohesion of U.S.-allied regional coalitions. Multinational 
operations are an integral part of the national military strategy, for "our Armed 
Forces will most otten fight in concert with regional allies and friends, as 
coalitions can decisively increase combat power and lead to a more favorable 
outcome to a conflict.,,17 However, when facing a TBM-armed adversary during 
the time frame of this study, the territory of the United States itself is unlikely to 
be directly threatened, while that of regional allies may well be. If that threat is 
chemical, biological, or nuclear, the political leadership of likely coalition 
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partners may look to their own strategic security and decide that making 
common cause with the United States against a local hegemon is not an 
attractive option. "A window for internationally supported military action 
against a proliferator may close as the country gains the capability to retaliate 
against additional countries at greater ranges.,,18 
If, however, the National Command Authorities see US. vital interests set 
sufficiently at risk, the nation can pursue unilateral military action. This is a 
fundamental tenet of the national military strategy. However, such a course not 
only risks potential collateral damage to, and direct retaliation against , US. friends 
in the region, but also focuses attention on a vital and vulnerable third center of 
gravity at the strategic level of war: the political will of the American people. 
Since facing German mustard gas and phosgene in 1918, American forces 
have not had to operate on a WMD battlefield, and the American body politic 
has never felt the stunning shock of a nuclear weapon. While overwhelming 
American conventional military superiority can directly threaten a regional 
enemy's ability to make war on American forces, that enemy could in turn use 
TBM-delivered WMD capability to threaten American will to make war on him. 
In the media age, US. military action is increasingly dependent on the 
vicissitudes of public support-and the American public does not support long 
wars or heavy casualties. The public reaction to hostile use of weapons of mass 
destruction, covered minute by minute on CNN, might well collapse popular 
support for national policy. 
Emotional popular reaction can sway policy either way, however. Thousands 
slain at Pearl Harbor stiffened national will, while eighteen dead in Mogadishu 
catalyzed withdrawal. Public perception of world events cannot always be 
accurately predicted by military and political professionals. What is certain, 
though, is that in our democracy, however imperfect, public perception 
determines public support for national military action; and if the strategic 
security of the United States is not perceived to be at risk, that support might 
well evaporate. The initiation of armed conflict is the ultimate expression of the 
political will of the people of a democracy, and such conflict cannot long 
continue unsupported by that will. 19 
Fou, Pillars oJTBMD. An imminent threat to these vital centers of gravity-the 
military force itself, the cohesion of a regional alliance or coalition, and the 
political will of the American people-demands a robust response . As theater 
ballistic missile defense systems and doctrine have evolved since DESERT 
STORM, discussions of Joint TBMD capability have settled upon a common 
construct of "Four Pillars ofTBMD" -actually, three pillars and a plinth: Active 
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Defense, Attack Operations, and Passive Defense, all supported by a base of 
Battle Management Command, Control , Communications ,  Computers , and 
Intelligence (BMC4I) . 
TBMD active defense, the interception of theater ballistic missiles in flight , is 
the focus of this study; it is the centerpiece of naval TBMD capabilitie s.  In the era 
of the Soviet threat , an early basic tenet of U.S. naval antiair warfare doctrine was 
"Shoot the archer, not the arrow." Destruction of strike aircraft offered far 
greater defensive leverage than attempts to individually intercept their inbound 
weapons. Since TBMs are ground-launched, active defense assets must face the 
arrows, and this constraint defines the nature of active defense operations. 
Entirely aside from the mechanical and mathematical challenges posed by 
small, high-speed balJistic targets, active defense is innately diffIcult because it 
must start out from "behind the power curve." Planning for TBMD active 
defense attempts to compensate for the challenging nature of the target by 
working to achieve defense in-depth: early sensor cueing, followed by multiple 
shot opportunities for complementary interceptor systems throughout the 
course of an inbound missile's flight. In the Joint TBMD environment of 2 008 , 
this might include airborne laser attacks against a theater ballistic missile while it 
is still in boost phase (ascending, rocket motor burning) ; Theater Wide TBMD 
system attack during ascent phase (after boost ,  before apogee) ; multiple Theater 
Wide system interception opportunities during midcourse flight (after apogee, 
before reentry) ; and endgame attacks by area defense TBMD systems in the 
terminal phase (following reentry) . 
The defining characteristics of TBMD active defense thus include : 
• The need for the earliest possible warning ofTBM preparation and launch, 
along with the most rapid netted cueing of active defense sensors and 
systems; 
• A related requirement for close, highly automated coordination between 
complementary defensive systems in the joint environment; 
• A tactical preference for systems that achieve intercept early in the TBM 
trajectory in order to mitigate WMD warhead effects and avoid the need 
for single-target endgame defense ; and, 
• Rigorous fire discipline and reliable kill assessment to prevent wasteful 
expenditure of a limited interceptor inventory. 
All of these requirements are likely to be magnified by a potential force 
mismatch between the number of TBMD interceptors available in theater and 
the number of TBMs in the enemy order of battle at the outset of hostilities. 
Attack operations-aggressive interdiction of enemy TBM assets and 
infrastructure on the ground-have the highest potential defensive leverage and 
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pose by far the greatest operational challenge of any pillar of TBMD. If successful, 
they can destroy missiles and associated WMD before launch, decimate vehicles 
and infrastructure to prevent further launches, and put fearful pressure on enemy 
TBM transporter-erector-Iauncher (TEL) crews to run, hide, and fire in sloppy 
haste-if at all. If, on the other hand, the friendly force 's attack operations are 
relatively unsuccessful , they can entangle vast numbers of strike, tanker, and 
reconnaissance aircraft needed elsewhere in theater, and fruitlessly risk highly 
trained special operations personnel deep in enemy territory. 
Along with basic passive defense measures and area defense-capable Patriot 
active defense, rudimentary attack operations formed the only coalition TBMD 
capability available during DESERT STORM ; the results were decidedly mixed. 
Attack operations will evolve and advance by 2008, but they will still have to be 
able to  overcome the basic challenge they face today-an extremely demanding 
tactical timeline. 
A defining construct for attack operations is the military mnemonic of the 
"OODA Loop;' the cycle of observe, orient ,  decide, act.  The combatant who has 
sufficient information and agility to consistently operate "inside "  his opponent's 
OODA loop, deciding and acting faster, is likely to prevail. Against TEL-mobile 
TBMs, the attack operations OODA cycle is very challenging. Attack assets, 
either airborne or ground-based, must be in position, armed, fueled, and alert 
when a TBM launch occurs or a TEL is detected. These assets must then be  able 
to orient on their designated target and initiate an attack before the TEL moves 
and hides. The decision timeline from detection to attack is measured in 
minutes, and is still not consistently met , even years after DESERT STORM. 
During the Roving Sands 95 Joint Tactical Air Operations ExerCIse, "even with 
special operations forces and a Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle dedicated to 
locating [an] SS-21 battery, it successfully fired all missiles-many with 
[simulated] chemical warheads-against some 20 corps and division targets.,, 20 
Furthermore, although attack operations form a pillar of theater ballistic 
missile defense, the nature of these actions is distinctly offensive, carried out by 
U.S.  or coalition forces on territory controlled by the enemy. Rules of 
engagement and command and control issues are therefore certain to be 
different and likely to be more constrained than those associated with active 
defense. While a commander may see much to  be gained through the vigorous 
pursuit of attack operations, his actual freedom to carry them out , especially in 
the early days of a conflict (when active defense forces are likely to be severely 
challenged) may nonetheless be distinctly circumscribed. 
The defining characteristics of TBMD attack operations include:  
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• High defensive leverage due to a potential ability to prevent or degrade 
TBM launches and destroy WMD on enemy territory; 
• High difficulty and high danger due to a compressed decision cycle and 
the need for operations in or over enemy territory; 
• A need to address the emergent threat of an enemy's coordinated use of 
highly capable SAMs (e . g. , SA- 12) to defend TBM launch areas;21 
• The likelihood that mission execution and rules of engagement will be 
under very restrictive centralized control; and, 
• The imperative for continuous improvement of sensor-to-shooter 
connectivity and cross-service linkage of j oint sensors (including those 
active defense sensors that can aid attack operations) . 
Passive defense "reduces the probability of and minimizes the effects of 
[TBM] attack by limiting an enemy's target acquisition capability, reducing the 
vulnerability of critical forces and supporting infrastructure , and improving the 
potential to survive and resume operations after an attack., ,12 The very 
limitations that cause regional aggressors to rely on TBM forces may tend to 
decrease the utility of some classic passive defense measures such as the use of 
decoy targets and EMCON. Hostile systems with long range, large warheads and 
poor CEP are most likely to be fired against large, fixed, area targets such as ports 
and airfields; and they are more likely still to be simply launched against cities as 
terror weapons attacking political centers of gravity. 
Passive defense directed against an enemy's limited battle damage assessment 
capability, or used to enhance dissemination of early warning to civilians, has 
more promise. Dispersal, mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) passive 
measures against WMD, inoculation of personnel against bio-agents, and 
temporary fortification of military facilities and individual units can be 
accomplished through training, doctrine, and habit .23  By their very nature , 
military formations are acculturated to the basic practices of passive defense, and 
thus are resilient and survivable if properly equipped and well-led. The same 
may not be said of urban civilian populations.  Aggressors know this, and "soft" 
population centers are thus attractive as TBM targets. 
Such Douhetian thinking is borne out by the results of Global Wargame '95 
at Newport, Rhode Island, and Wargame 95B at the National Test Facility, 
Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. Both examined major hostile TBM effortS 
directed against nonmilitary population centers. In a regional conflict, then, the 
CINC might well reap significant benefits through multinational-force 
coordination of passive defense efforts for population centers on his theater 
Defended Assets List (DAL) . "It is critical to plan for and disseminate TM 
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[theater missile] launch warning and impact area prediction to civil authorities, 
as well as coalition forces . . . .  The theater CINC and his subordinates should 
consider assisting the host nation civil authorities in establishing passive defense 
measures for the civilian population., ,24 
The defining characteristics of TBMD passive defense thus include: 
• The vital importance of intelligence and early warning. Th e specific 
capabilities of the threat must be well understood in order to plan effective 
passive defense measures. I mplementation of those measures in a timely 
manner (and with a minimum of false alerts) requires effective early 
warnIng. 
• Despite an understandable propensity on the part of military commanders 
to concentrate on the maintenance of their military capabilities and the 
welfare of their personnel, political realities may well shift that 
concentration toward provision of passive defense for threatened civilIan 
populations. 
• Early warning of a TBM launch and a determination of the likely target are 
relatively easy to obtain . Presently , it is harder to disseminate this 
information quickly , effectively, and jointly. 
Intelligence, early warning, and information dissemination are vital to 
effective passive defense. A key enabler, then, for this pillar of TBMD is the 
capability which also supports active defense and attack operations, the plinth 
beneath the pillars: battle management command, control, communications, 
computers and intelligence. 
BMC4I for the TBMD battle encompasses far more than issues of command 
and control. It is indeed an "architecture," a commander's "system of systems." 
BMC4I seeks to overcome the greatest difficulties of TBMD-distance (great) 
and time (little)-by integrating focused intelligence collection, early warning, 
sensor cueing, defensive system response , and assessment of system effectiveness. 
As TBMD systems and capabilities evolve toward 2008, the BMC4I core 
concept of integration becomes critical ,  much more than just a matter of 
semantics. Under the necessary developmental discipline imposed by the need 
for joint TBMD operations, more and more systems are achieving a degree of 
interoperability, either through initial design or by means of "gateways" added to 
older systems. "Interoperability suggests a compatibility of communications 
means and message formats.  I t  produces a capability to share information 
directly." 25 
This is constructive but strictly evolutionary. The NAVCENT portion of 
lessons learned from the major TBMD training exercise Roving Sands 95 reads, 
in part : "We are still a long way from true interoperability . . . .  We are not sharing 
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data, merely conducting communications, passing tracks and overlays . . .  and 
providing correlation.,,26 As envisioned for joint TBMD, BMC4I seeks to achieve 
the revolutionary seamless battle space implied by true integration. Thus, in the 
words of the Joint Staff: "Integration suggests more than just compatibility. It 
suggests a decision to respond to shared information in accordance with 
prearranged conventions and agreements. The net effect is a degree of synergy 
which would not otherwise occur.,,27 
The characteristics of BMC4I for effective TBMD include :  
• An overall responsibility for comprehensive coordination of the TBMD 
battle , from initial intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB) to 
interceptor kill evaluation and assessment of damage to protected assets 
following TBM attack; 
• The need to disseminate TBMD surveillance and warning data derived 
from national technical systems in such a way that time-critical defensive 
operations in theater are supported, while national technical capabilities 
are not compromised; 
• A fundamental importance to the execution of TBMD active defense,  
attack operations, and passive defense ; 
• The pivotal objective of achieving a "system of systems" for TBMD which 
is truly integrated, allowing automated exchange of data between joint 
TBMD components in a seamless manner (design requirements of the 
projected joint planning network, joint data network, and joint composite 
tracking network reflect this goal) ; and, 
• A daunting degree of complexity which currently presents the most 
massive and difficult technical challenge of any dimension of theater 
ballistic missile defense.  
Present Capability 
The international tendencies and trends that demonstrate the need for 
capable theater ballistic missile defenses are compelling, as is the historical 
evidence of that need stemming from DESERT STORM. However, before 
examining the TBMD-related issues of concern to a Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander in 2008, it is necessary to establish "ground truth:'  a 
brief, accurate description of where U.S.  active defense TBMD capabilities stand 
now. If a regional contingency involving a TBM-armed, WMD -capable 
adversary were to erupt tomorrow, what active defense systems could U.S. forces 
bring to the fight? 
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Baseline TBMD Active Difense Capability.  "Today, the nation's existing TBM 
defense capability rests with the Patriot system and its evolving improvements.,,28 
In the numerous exciting reports of ongoing TBMD development, it is easy for 
the seagoing operator to become confused by the whirl of programs and 
budgets, COEA studies ,  R&D pilot ventures ,  operational tests and evaluations, 
battle group workups ,  "future studies;' and wargaming simulations. Thick 
briefing books and lengthy slide presentations show a plethora of systems in 
advanced stages of development, either being tested or awaiting further funding. 
There is , however, only one active defense weapon ready to go to war now, and 
that is Patriot (MIM-1 04) . 
Patriot was conceived as a mobile, all-weather air defense missile, with the 
XMIM-1 04 design specified in 1 965 .29 TBMD capability was not available until 
the deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability 1 (PAC-1 ) in 1 988 .  PAC-2, the 
Patriot version that earned fame in the Gulf War, was not deployed until 
DESERT SHIELD in 1 990. Thus, the current version of the MIM-1 04 is a 
product-improved variant of an interceptor designed three  decades ago. 
Since DESERT STORM, the missile has been modified twice, first under the 
Patriot quick response (QR) program (1 99 1 -1 992), and more recently through 
the introduction of Patriot PAC-2 GEM (guidance enhanced missile) in 
February 1 995.  "We will field about 350 of these missiles, which will provide the 
principal improvement in our defensive capability until the Patriot Advanced 
Capability-3 begins deployments . . . .  ,,30 
Patriot is an area-defense weapon, intercepting TBMs in the terminal phase of 
their traj ectory, well inside the atmosphere, and engaging them with a 
proximity-fuzed blast-fragmentation warhead. This type of system has inherent 
limitations against TBM chemical submunitions , a critical concern which drove 
the selection of an entirely new missile, the extended range interceptor 
(ERINT), using hit-to-kill technology, (or Patriot PAC-3. The very short 
standoff range of PAC-2 intercepts also makes likely effectiveness against a 
barometric-fuzed nuclear TBM problematic, and destruction of very high-speed 
long-range TBM reentry vehicles impossible. 
The system itself, consisting of headquarters, communications, and support 
equipment, 4-cell launching stations (LS) organized into 8-LS fire units (FU) , 
each with its own MPQ-53 radar, and 6-FU battalions (1 92 missiles) , is 
air-transportable, but not tactically mobile.3! Emplacement and relocation o(fire 
units can be done expeditiously, but Patriot cannot "fire on the move." In effect, 
it is a [lXed point defense system for stationary targets. 
Getting Patriot into theater takes lift. Lots of lift. Movement of a PAC-2 
battalion with one full missile reload takes 301 C-1 4 1  sorties.32 Moving two fire 
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units from Germany to I srael during DESERT STORM "required more than 50 
C-5As, and because of  bed-down limitations and refueling requirements, 
diverted over 1 20 sorties each day [through 48 hours] from other high priority 
lift requirements., ,33 
Since regional deployment of Patriot means installation of U.S. military 
equipment and personnel on foreign soil, such deployment is unlikely prior to 
imminent hostilities,  except in relatively developed theaters such as western 
Europe or northeast Asia (e. g. ,  South Korea) . Even in such "TBM-rich" 
environments as the Arabian Gulf, political sensitivities may impede timely 
deployment or reinforcement of this single U. S. TBMD active defense system. 
TBMD as a "System of Systems. " The relatively short range and limited mobility 
of the Patriot PAC-2 restricts the nature of active defense TBMD plans built 
around this system. Current concepts feature "enclaves" provided for specific 
critical assets. "The composite envelope, which is the collection of fire units 
producing the protected envelope and the critical assets in the area under the 
envelope, is designated an enclave.,,34 Since DESERT STORM, interim TBMD 
enhancement efforts have involved initiatives to expand the volume of Patriot 
enclaves.  Because the MPQ-53 radar out-ranges the MIM- 1 04 interceptor itself, 
one way to enlarge an enclave would be to move fire units down-range (down the 
likely threat axis) from the radar supporting them. The quick resp onse (QR) 
program of 1 99 1 -1 992 did just this , giving the system the ability to "deploy missile 
launchers up to 1 2km from their associated fire-control radar, which enlarges the 
defended area.,,35 However, given the absolute performance limitations of the 
PAC-2 missile, further enhancements to the enclave concept have had to come 
from other areas, such as improving overall system performance through 
leveraging BMC4I and pursuing the synergistic effect of a "system of systems." 
Enclave defense with range-limited weapons has always demanded a measure 
of grit from warriors. In 1 775 ,  holding Breed's Hill outside Boston, Colonel 
William Prescott considered the effectiveness of his smoothbore muskets, scant 
artillery, and limited ammunition, and told the patriots commanding the 
batteries, "Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes." Today's Patriot 
battery commander cannot fire until the white-hot meteor of a reentering TBM 
streaks through the sky inbound to his enclave. At least Prescott could see the 
British coming for a long time. Early warning as to the size, nature, and 
disposition of a threat increases situational awareness and thus the efficiency of 
the defense. For the TBMD battle today, that warning come s from space. 
Current TBMD space-based early warning depends on Defense Support 
Program (DSP) satellites originally deployed to detect strategic ICBM launches .  
18 
Theater Ballistic Missile Difense from the Sea 
Their capability against smaller TBMs with asso ciated lower signatures is limited, 
but has been enhanced by USSPACECOM through the implementation of the 
ALERT (attack and launch early report to theater) system. "It is the operational 
version of prototype TM [theater missile] warning efforts developed by the 
tactical exploitation of national capabilities  (TEN CAP) office under the Talon 
Shield program.,,36 ALERT and its theater-deployed derivative, JTAGS Goint 
tactical ground station) , process information from multiple satellites viewing a 
single launch , thus gaining "stereo DSP" data. 
System software calculates tactical parameters such as time, latitude, longitude and 
altitude for comparison with known theater ballistic missile profiles . . . .  Identify­
ing the missile by means of the profile allows . " a least-squares fit of observed alti­
tude and downrange distance as a function of time . . . .  Loft can be added to the 
four-state fit as a fifth parameter to permit manipulation of the profile in both alti­
tude and downrange distance." 
The ALERT system can thus provide TBM launch time and estimated launch 
position (critical for attack operations) , probable missile type (which may have 
specific engage ability and warhead implications) , missile state vectors (for 
midcourse prediction) , and impact point prediction (for efficient area defense 
and effective passive defense) . 
ALERT, however, is part of the national tactical event system (TES) ,  located in 
proximity to many other national capabilities near Colorado Springs,  Colorado. 
Communications restrictions imposed by the need to filter other sensitive 
national systems data carried on the same nets can retard dissemination of 
ALE RT fused data. The system can meet a warning goal of90 seconds-but that 
window represents elapsed time from sensor to CINC-not sensor to TBMD 
shooter. Studies have shown that some enemy missiles may impact their targets 
before the associated ALERT cues reach the in-theater defensive assets that need 
them. The operational BMC4I solution to this time lag is th e modular, 
truck-mounted, air-mobile DSP theater processing node-JTAGS. 
The JTAGS system can process, fuse, and disseminate information from up to 
three DSP satellites (if its antennae can "see" that many of the geosynchronous 
sensors) . Two prototypes are now operationally deployed, one in Germany and 
the other in South Korea. The contractor has an option for production of a 
further five units. 38 JTAGS -pro cessed DSP information provided in theater to an 
Army force projection tactical operations center (FPTO C) can enhance existing 
TBMD active defense capability by quickly determining which of several 
enclaves may be threatened by a given TBM launch, forwarding the cueing 
information to the correct Patriot information coordination central (ICC) 
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vehicle at the battalion level, and thence to the individual MSQ-1 04 engagement 
control stations (ECS) . 
Though the MPQ-53 radar cannot directly accept external cueing data, that is 
a major goal of current TBMD BMC4I integration efforts. Exercises are ongoing, 
especially involving AEGIS SPY radar data provided to Patriot via the Navy's 
new cooperative engagement capability (CEC) . For example, one recent test 
"was designed to show how CEC could help defend Europe . . . .  A total of 3 1  
simulated 'Scud' missiles were 'launched' from locations in N orth Africa. The 
launch and predicted impact point of each target ,  together with 'very near 
real-time' control data,  was calculated by CEC and transmitted to [a] Patriot 
battery some 1 ,450km away. . . .  , ,39 What must be  borne in mind ,  however, is that 
such recently demonstrated c apabilities are experimental rather than 
operational .  Again quoting CENT COM lessons learned from the recent Roving 
Sands 95 exercise : "The inability to real time cue and coordinate sensor data 
between AEGIS SPY and Patriot MPQ-53 radars limits our effectiveness.,,4o 
Implications oj the Baseline. The implications for TBMD active defense failure 
to move beyond this baseline are far-reaching. The procurement power of such 
TBMD organizations as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and 
the Navy's Program Executive Office for Theater Air Defense, PEO (TAD) , is 
not in doubt; but ftscal constraint has been a significant factor in Department of 
Defense program planning since 1 9 85 .  Hence, in considering the state of U.S.  
theater defenses against an evolving threat, one must carefully consider what 
James Edward Pitts has called the " consequences of not jUnding., ,4 !  
Regarding Patriot during DESERT STORM, to paraphrase Dr.  Johnson: i t  
was not the fact that it did its  job well that amazes,  but the fact that it did it  at  all. 
The current system, especially when deployed with the latest guidance­
enhanced missile (GEM) and supported by ]TAGS, will be quite capable against 
that same baseline threat .  However, as the first section of this chapter explained,  
the "baseline threat" is  inexorably evolving beyond the Patriot PAC-2 
engagement envelope, pushed by two great TBM trends: increasing ballistic 
missile system range and the frightening capability of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
Increasing theater ballistic missile range (which can be  achieved by decreasing 
payload, adding stages,  or simply strapping on additional boosters) increases 
reentry velocity. Baseline defensive systems with limited standoff range , such as 
Patriot PAC-2, rapidly reach a point where they cannot acquire, track, launch ,  
and achieve intercept quickly enough .  The kinematics o f  the attacking missile 
have gotten inside the OODA loop of the defending interceptor. Such absolute 
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physical limitations can only be overcome by fielding a different system; this fact 
has compelled development of PAC-3 ERINT and even longer range systems 
such as SM2 Block IVA Navy Area, Army THAAD (theater high altitude area 
defense) , and the very long-range Navy Theater Wide (NTw, using the SM3 
missile) system. None is a substitute for another ; all are complementary 
components of an evolving active defense family-of-systems. 
In addition to providing robust capability against long-range, high-speed 
systems, or shorter range, high-apogee (lofted trajectory) TBMs, exoatmospheric 
TBMD systems such as THAAD and NTW provide an essential capability against 
weapons of mass destruction, which-to repeat-baseline systems do not. Even 
a highly lethal area defense hit-to-kill design such as PAC-3 will cause the release 
of some WMD components into the air upon intercept consummation. Only 
the Theater Wide defense systems have the ability to  make the kill in space,  
forcing any surviving WMD materials to careen into the atmosphere unshielded.  
Theater Wide systems also extend the battle space, a primary goal of any 
commander, while the baseline system does not; indeed, the current baseline 
system surrenders not only battle space, but also vital intelligence to the enemy. 
The fixed enclaves and point-defense limitations of PAC-2 announce clearly 
which asse ts on the DAL the CINC intends to defend, and thus, conversely, 
which he is willing to sacrifice. 
The CINC may not even be able to make that admittedly difficult choice 
expeditiously, for political sensitivitie s may constrain his ability to emplace 
TBMD asse ts before the onset of hostilities. Once conflict commences, strategic 
lift sensitivities could inhibit his ability to reactively deploy active defenses even 
more. "When a crisis occurs, the real-time decision to devote scarce airlift assets 
to move a Patriot battalion instead of infantry or artillery equipment will be 
difficult and pressing."<Z 
If the TBM threat continues to evolve , then j oint TBMD capability must 
progress beyond the baseline. In the military world, as in the natural world, 
over-specialization is an invitation to catastrophe. A robust response to an 
evolving threat requires diverse capabilities fully integrated through a common 
BMC4I architecture. During the crucial early days of a regional contingency, 
when "the Navy kicks open the door and holds it open for the heavy land 
forces:'  the TBMD active defense capabilities most likely to be picked from that 
diverse palette by the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will be 
naval. <3 If the us. military moves resolutely beyond the baseline,  the JFMCC will 
have flexible, deployable, multitiered n aval TBMD capability available by 2008 . 
The proj ected characteristics of those specific systems are the subject  of the next 
section. 
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Naval TBMD Active Defense Capabilities to 2008 
"The Navy TBMD system shall be comprised of two tiers, which provides for 
an Area Oower tier) defense and Theater Wide (upper tier) defense. The Naval 
TBMD system shall provide capability against the full range of TBM threats for 
protection of joint forces, sea and air lines of communications, command and 
control facilities, vital political and military assets, supporting infrastructure, and 
population centers.,,44 Navy Area TBMD will be provided by the SM2 Block IVA 
interceptor, while Navy Theater Wide (NTW) will likely depend on the SM3 
missile, carrying an infrared-homing kinetic warhead. Sensor capability will be 
built around the AEGIS-organic SPY radar, with off-board cueing from 
JTAGS-type fused DSP data. Because of the highly automated, highly integrated, 
self-contained nature of modern warships, much of the framework for the 
projected joint TBMD BMC4I architecture is already in place on AEGIS 
combatants. As stated in chapter I of this study, it is presumed that the 
architecture will be fully functional by 2008. 
Navy Area TBMD. The SM2 Block IVA interceptor represents the latest stage in 
the remarkable evolution of the Navy's standard missile, a weapon whose roots 
reach back to the TARTAR and TERRIER offspring of the BUMBLEBEE antiair 
warfare program of the 1 95 0s. N avy Area is one of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization "core" TBMD systems , and thus (along with Patriot PAC-3 , 
THAAD, and Navy Theater Wide) has a great deal of developmental and 
bureaucratic momentum. A contingency capability of two Navy Area AEGIS 
cruisers with at least 35 SM2 Block IVA missiles will put to sea by the end of the 
4S century. 
The Block IVA missile itself i s  a boosted, high-mach, long-range, solid-fuel 
interceptor with "dual mode" terminal homing (IR primary and semi-active 
RF secondary) and a blast-fragmentation warhead specifically enhanced for the 
TBMD role. The combination of precise guidance (which increases the chance 
of a direct " skin-to-skin" hit or very near miss) with a powerful explosive 
warhead makes this interceptor extremely potent.46 Proximity-fuzed, it therefore 
does not suffer the one maj or drawback of kinetic-energy hit-to-kill 
systems-their all-or-nothing gamble on flawless guidance and successful 
terminal homing. 
Like Patriot PAC-3 , SM2 Block IVA will be multimission capable, lethal 
against cruise missiles and manned aircraft in addition to TBMs. However, as 
shown during Roving Sands 95 , its "defended footprint" will be far larger than 
that of PAC-3 , allowing a rudimentary layered defense using only "lower-tier" 
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systems if Patriot is in place in a littoral enclave. Against a simulated 
600km-range TBM , a Navy Area engagement at 1 20km is possible many more 
times than is a PAC-3 intercept against the same target.47 Maximum intercept 
altitude, which is critical against WMD warheads, is also considerably greater, at 
35km-a height of over 1 1 3 ,000 feet.4s Additionally, it should be noted that for 
short-range TBMs with apogees (highest point of ballistic trajectory) within the 
atmosphere, Navy Area will be the only naval active defense system capable of 
engaging, because the Navy Theater Wide SM3 interceptor functions outside 
the atmosphere. 
Such figures, however, need to be evaluate d carefully. The defended fo otprint 
of any area defense TBMD interceptor de creases as the velocity of the incoming 
TBM target increases. Ballistic missile terminal velocity is a function of system 
range ; so the longer the range of the enemy system, the smaller the area that can 
be defended by lower tier systems. For example, against a 900km-range TBM, 
Navy Area engagement range drops to 65km, or approximately thirty-five 
nautical miles-ranges familiar to shipboard operators of early fleet AW SM2 . 
49 vanants. 
The thoughtful reader must beware of oversimplification.  The conc ept of a 
" defended footprint"-in effect a Navy Area enclave-represents a complex 
geometry dependent on many factors ,  including TBM range and relate d 
terminal velocity, radar cross-section (ReS) ,  and the spatial relationship between 
the AEGIS ship and the asset it is  defending. Furthermore,  in a littoral 
environment, Navy Area systems will have to provide greater coverage than 
equivalent ground-based systems because of the prospect of a shoal-water 
"buffer" between the TBMD ship and the DAL target it is defending. Area 
defense systems generally benefit from collocation with the assets they are 
defending, but it often will be difficult for a Navy Area ship to patrol in 
proximity to the asset it is assigned to protect. Until ground-based systems are 
emplaced in theater, Navy Area ships will need all the reach they can get to 
"hold open the door." 
Well forward, defending an amphibious objective area or other military assets 
against short-range TBM threats, that inland Navy Area "reach" will be 
considerable. Defending political or population targets far from the main 
military engagement , however, not only takes multimission ships an d tethers 
them to single targets; it also markedly shrinks the footprint area and 
engagement altitude of their defended envelopes against just those hostile 
systems (long-range TBMs) most likely to be employe d with WMD, weapons 
which tend to negate the value of close-in point defense. This long-range , 
politically targeted WMD-capable threat postulated for 2008 drives the need for 
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another layer of protection to complement the versatile, capable, but limited scope 
of Navy Area. That seagoing "upper tier" capability is Navy Theater Wide. 
Navy Theater Wide (NTW). Interception of theater ballistic missiles outside the 
atmosphere using Theater Wide active defense systems is fundamentally 
different from the more intuitive "goalkeeping" defense accomplished by lower 
tier systems. Conceptually, it may be helpful to think of Theater Wide defenses 
as being akin to long-range CAP engaged in the classic AW outer-air battle , with 
area defenses fighting the close-range battle within the battle group's missile 
engagement zone (MEZ) . As with C AP aircraft, the area defended by an NTW 
ship depends more on the location of the defensive platform than on the 
location of the defended target. 
Rather than an enclave-like defended footprint surrounding a single target, 
NTW involves an "area ofnegation" within which a single AEGIS ship can patrol 
in order to intercept TBMs en route from a hostile launch area to many different 
friendly targets. Herein lies the tremendous leverage of NTW, and the 
explanation for TBMD briefing slides that show a handful of NTW ships 
defending all of southern Europe or all of Japan from TBM attack. The 
kinematics of the NTW interceptor have eliminated the need for these ships to 
be collocated with single defended assets. Instead, the ships are positioned either 
somewhat forward in large areas of negation that allow multiple exoatmospheric 
midcourse and descent-phase intercepts in support of hard-pressed area defense 
systems, or well forward, where they can exercise the upper tier capability 
unique to the Navy Theater Wide system-ascent phase intercept. 
Ascent phase intercept is the holy grail of naval TBMD. The only active 
defense technique that can possibly exceed its leverage is boost phase intercept 
(BPI) , attacking TBMs while the missiles are still accelerating away from their 
launchers. Boost phase systems and doctrine remain primarily in the Air Force 
corner of the joint TBMD arena. Ascent phase active defense, by contrast, 
engages the strengths of NTW AEGIS combatants, which can patrol in 
international waters off a hostile shore, with their Spy radars looking inland, 
awaiting (but not requiring) a DSP cue. As soon as a launch is detected and ROE 
are met, an NTW interceptor can be on its way to destroy the TBM as soon as it 
rises above the atmosphere.so Such a proactive capability produces a defended 
area covering tens of thousands of square miles. 
The only TBMD weapon that will do this is the SM3. Only four inches 
longer than the SM2 Block IVA, the SM3 missile is actually a four-stage system, 
starting with the Mk72 booster and Mk 1 04 solid rocket motor it shares with the 
Navy Area interceptor. "The inertially guided, nozzle-controlled advanced solid 
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axial stage (ASAS) [Now "TSRM " for "Third Stage Rocket Motor"] motor will 
constitute the third stage . . . .  The fourth stage wilJ be the autonomous LEAP 
KKV [Kinetic Kill Vehicle] .,,51 Guidance technologies used in this extremely 
long-range system include missile command uplink, inertial, GPS, and infrared 
terminal homing. The kinetic warhead (KW) contains no explosive charge. 
Maneuvering autonomously with thrusters,  it homes on the IR signature of the 
hot TBM revealed against the cold vacuum of space, closing for the kill at several 
times the velocity of the fastest rifle bullet.  The kinetic energy of a moving 
object equals one-half the object's mass times the square of its velocity. Thus the 
small but very fast KW packs a serious kinetic punch. When combined with the 
squared inbound velocity and much greater mass of the incoming TBM, the 
energy released in the intercept collision is tremendously destructive. If that 
TBM is carrying a chemical, biological, or nuclear payload, the components are 
shattered and dispersed outside the atmosphere. 
The potential capability of this system is so significant that challenges to its 
development have proven to be not only technical but political . There has been 
considerable controversy surrounding the potential effect of NTW on the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Again , though , it is necessary to review the 
numbers carefully. When considering Russian strategic systems, " ICBM speed of 
6-7 km/ sec easily outdistances the 4-5 km/ sec of the interceptor, precluding an 
ascent phase intercept. If an AEGIS ship is near the terminal target of the 
ICBM-by the time an interceptor can be fired and flown out to intercept, the 
RVs [Reentry Vehicles] are below the minimum altitude of the exoatmospheric 
hit to kill vehicle .,,52 Consequently, while the SM3 is potentially extremely 
capable against medium range ballistic missiles, it is not c apable of effectively 
engaging the high-speed reentry vehicles of a strategic ICBM. 
The eventual influence of modern theater ballistic missile defense technology 
on a treaty involving strategic defense signed nearly a quarter century ago is still 
being hotly debated, but naval TBMD active defense development is continuing 
apace and could be available as currently envisioned in 2008. "Both the Navy 
Area TBMD and the Theater Wide capability have been certified by the 
D epartment of Defense to the Congress as fully treaty compliant., , 53 
Sensors. The primary sensor for naval TBMD active defense will be the AEGIS 
SPY radar. The TBM-tracking capabilities of Spy are being explored and 
expanded through the use of non-tactical data collection (NTDC) software 
"patches:' experimental modifications that will lead to a tactical TBMD-capable 
program version. Thus modified, Spy radars have "demonstrated the ability to 
track TBMs at ranges well in excess of 500km . . . .  , , 54  
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As with any radar, tracking range is highly dependent on the radar cro ss 
section (RCS) of the target, and Spy autonomous range s  again st more 
challenging TBMs will decrease accordingly. Here, battle space can be regained 
through cooperative tracking by two AEGIS ships, the forward "picket" linking 
tracks to a consort downrange until the second ship can acquire the target. This 
capability has been demonstrated in several TBMD extended tracking exerci se s ,  
including Joint Task Force QTF-95) demonstrations of the new Cooperative 
Engagement Capability (CEC) , the pre sent-day precursor to the joint compo site 
tracking network postulated for 2008 . JTF-95 test s  included "a CEC cueing and 
composite tracking of a TBM target, initially detected by USS ANZIO's SPY- l  
radar just after launch . . . . Other CEC units . . .  were all automatically cued to 
acquire the target within seconds. Each maintained a single composite track on 
the target until it splashed down."" 
Cooperative tracking against low-RCS target s can also be enhanced by 
stationing ships off-axi s from the threat traj ectory. Multiple aspects of the TBM 
are thus illuminated by the Spy radar s of more than one ship. What might be a 
very challenging target head-on may give a useful return from it s beam aspect. 
The composite data shared via CEC take s advantage of this phenomenon and 
thus provide s all platforms in the network with the be st possible track on the 
target TBM. 
Battle space can be gained not only through sharing track data between 
radars, but also by using the RF energy of any given radar more efficiently. Spy 
must search for and detect a TBM before it can acquire and transition-to-track. If 
radar waveforms and anticipated search volume can be "fine-tuned" early for 
TBM detection , Spy can acquire and track much faster, thus gaining time in the 
all-important TBMD OODA loop. Off-board cueing i s  the key to efficient radar 
management and early detection . 
In 2008, cueing to AEGIS will be primarily a USSPACECOM function via 
theater-based JTAGS, cONUS-based ALERT, and the third component of the 
tactical event system, the Navy'S Radiant Ivory-derived TACDAR (tactical 
detection and reporting) capability. The Joint Force Maritime Component 
Commander must therefore bear in mind that "as friendly operation s  shift in 
time and place, the T[B]MD planner must continually reevaluate the areas to be 
covered by DSp, and effect continual coordination with USSPACECOM to 
obtain that coverage.,,56 He must remember, however, that these sen sors are in a 
geosynchronous con stellation and are therefore far out in space. Any 
modification to the geometry of that constellation will therefore involve many 
mile s of satellite repo sitioning, with the associated consumption of limited 
thruster fuel. It will also take time. The need for stereo DSP coverage should be 
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established and agreed upon in the initial TBMD planning process, rather than 
when enemy launches commence. 
A significant limitation of national overhead sensors such as the DSP 
constellation is an inability to gather data on TBMs after boost phase, when the 
hot plume of the rocket motor no longer exists. This cueing gap will not be fully 
remedied until the space-based infrared system-low earth orbit 
(SBIRS-Low)-is deployed (pending full funding) . Even then, since SBIRS-Low 
is by definition a low-earth orbit system, it will have periodic, multipass coverage 
rather than the continuous "staring" coverage given by a geosynchronous sensor. 
Without post-boost information, lTAGS-type data will be  sufficient to support 
search volume limitation and waveform selection for SPY, but will not meet 
criteria for an optimum single beam cue, "an uncertainty volume small enough 
to be covered by a single beam of a Fire Control Radar system.,,57 
The importance of post-boost-phase sensors for supporting single beam Spy 
cueing has been clear to the Navy for several years, as shown by the work of 
Robert Powers, advocating the adaptation of infrared search and track (IRST) 
equipment to the E-2C aircraft. 58 Airborne IR systems can continue to track a 
TBM after its motor burns out by sensing skin heating of the missile body caused 
by the friction of its passage through the atmosphere. The E-2C/IRST concept 
was first known as Gatekeeper.59 
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Issues for the Maritime Component Conunander 
WHAT, THEN, ARE THE TBMD ISSUES with which the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must specifically concern himself? 
When considered in light of projected u.s. naval capabilities and anticipated 
regional threats ten years hence, areas of useful concentration for his particular 
attention coalesce around four key topics. These are : 
• Logistics 
• Command, Control,  and Intelligence 
• Warfighting 
• Rules of Engagement 
Logistics will be dealt with first, since this subject clearly illustrates the value 
of a straightforward operations analysis approach in order to bound an important 
discussion-a discussion which, when so bounded, reveals important caveats 
regarding the true complexity of war in the littoral, an arena of conflicting 
missions prosecuted with limited means. 
Command, control, and intelligence follows logistics, and considers that same 
complexity at three separate levels of leadership : above the ]FMCC at the NCA 
level; among competing component commanders at the theater level; and from 
the ]FMCC down to the unit level. Encompassing all levels, comprehensive 
intelligence preparation of the battle space is held to be essential to the ]FMCC's 
mastery of the subtleties of the TBMD mission, and thus his ability to make the 
hard choices necessary for its effective execution . 
The section on warfighting derives its arguments directly from the debates 
illustrated in the preceding pages,  setting forth some of those hard operational 
choices which will inevitably face the ]FMCC as a result of his own logistical 
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constraints and the operational intent of his sup eriors. The contrasting but 
complementary capabilities of Navy Theater Wide and Navy Area TBMD are 
thus considered. 
Finally, the essential issues of national policy and international law that must 
inform U.S. TBMD operations are presented below in a section on rules of 
engagement. As the final portion of the core chapter in this study, this 
consideration of the legal dilemmas and the inherent uncertainty with which 
the JFMCC must wrestle perhaps  represents an allegory, a cautionary tale, for the 
whole topic of theater ballistic missile defense delivered from the sea. 
Logistics 
With the general background provided in the preceding chapters, the reader 
is in a position to anticipate the issues that will confront the Joint Force 
Maritime Component Commander. For simplicity, this section will begin with 
the most straightforward: the physical characteristics of one's own force and an 
operations analysis-type approach to the issues that arise. The JFMCC must be 
fully cognizant of the key capabilities and limitations of his own forces.  In 
preparing for the theater ballistic missile defense mission, one of his primary 
concerns must thus be logistics , especially the unique stresses TBMD will place 
on the vital tasks of refueling and rearming his AEGI S  combatants. 
Iron Logic of Fuel: CG versus DDG . In a rapidly developing conflict against a 
TBM-capable foe,  the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander may find 
himself cast as the JFC's Leonidas, holding the pass at Thermopylae as the Persian 
arrows rain down, buying time for reinforcements to arrive in theater. If the 
limited naval theater ballistic missile defense capability initially available in 
theater is likely to be overmatched by sheer numbers of hostile missiles at the 
outset of a fight, then that capability must be used both effectively and efficiently. 
One of the strengths of modern U.S. naval combatants, and especially AEGIS 
ships, is their multi-mission versatility. Costly, complex, and capable, these ships 
excel at the "up, out, and down" missions of AW, SUW and USW Their role as 
potent TLAM strike platforms was critical during DESERT STORM: by 2008 , 
naval theater ballistic missile defense will be a major new AEGIS mission. The 
TBMD battle, however, is unlikely to take place in isolation-thus it will have to 
be conducted in both competition and cooperation with the other important 
missions given to the maritime component of the Joint Force, as its ships, aircraft, 
and Marines stand fast and secure the rapid buildup of land and air power in 
theater. 
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The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must use his highly 
capable but numerically limited AEGIS asse ts wisely, both in how he apportions 
them for a variety of missions and how he assigns them different tasks within the 
TBMD mission. Different ships and different missions are not created equal. For 
example, NTW brings more to the fight than Navy Area. If, however, enemy 
TBMs are short-range and low-apogee, this is a moot point, for they wilJ not be 
engage able by Theater Wide defenses. Nonetheless,  the highest leverage hostile 
systems will generally be those with the longest range, able to reach out and 
touch political targets, able to threaten the political centers of gravity of coalition 
cohesion and national will-to-fight. 
NTW counters this threat and counters it efficiently, by fielding a system with 
kinematics that allow TBM engagements in the ascent phase, during midcourse, 
and during descent before the endgame of area defense systems. One NTW 
platform can thus defend many targets on the DAL. Therefore, when faced with 
a robust enemy TBM order of battle and an ad hoc defense by whatever naval 
TBMD capability is currently deployed in theater, the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander should seek to maximize the NTW portion of the 
naval theater ballistic missile defense mission . 
If possible,  the JFMCC needs to get his NTW-capable AEGIS ships close to the 
enemy TBM launch areas and keep them there. Herein lies the rub. Both AEGIS 
cruisers (CG 47/52 class) and AEGIS destroyers (DDG 5 1  class) could, by 2008 ,  
be equipped t o  perform the NTW mission. But which ship would be more 
effIcient at a task which is, in effect, an antimissile deterrent patrol in a distant, 
perhaps isolated, NTW area of negation? A straightforward operations analysis 
approach may prove useful. 
In a hypothetical contingency, an AEGIS cruiser and destroyer are steaming in 
company with the CV and the AOE, having just refuelled to 1 00 percent 
capacity (98 percent available) . They are both ordered to proceed at 25 knots to 
separate NTW patrol areas, both 1 ,000 nautical miles distant. Upon arrival, they 
are each to patrol at quietest speed in accordance with their class combat systems 
doctrine, until they reach a fuel state of 50 percent, with contingency 
authorization to remain on station to 30 percent fuel. An escorted AO will refuel 
them on a regular RAS circuit until they are relieved by other NTW units .  
All ships have unique fuel consumption curves, and consumption rates will 
vary with sea conditions and degree of bottom fouling; but using the generic 
data contained in Class Tactical Manuals,60 the CG 47 Class Combat Systems 
Doctrine ,61 and a recent unclassified message from the AEGIS Program Office,62 
basic fuel consumption comparisons between the two AEGIS classes can be 
made. They are instructive. 
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After a 1 ,  OOOnm sprint, the cruiser can remain on station at 1 3  knots for 6 
days to 50 percent fuel, with a load on the electrical plant sufficient to keep Spy 
radiating at high power. Shifting the main plant to the nonstandard­
configuration low speed quiet mode (by following classified information in the 
combat systems doctrine) should boost endurance to 7}12 days at 5 knots. If the 
decision is made to drop to 30 percent fuel, on-station time is 1 0 days at 1 3  
knots , and just over 1 2  days at the low speed quiet mode 5 knots. 
Note the reason for the high 1 3-knot patrol speed. The cruiser, like most U.S. 
twin-screw combatants with controllable reversible pitch propellers, is  most 
quiet with both shafts powered and both props at 1 00 percent pitch. The 
Prairie/Masker system must also be aligned in accordance with the specific 
classified parameters in the class combat systems doctrine. Below 1 00 percent 
pitch, the props cavitate. The slowest speed the cruiser will normally make at 
1 00 percent pitch on both shafts is between 1 2  and 1 3  knots. Low speed quiet 
mode achieves improved quieting, lower speed, and greater fuel economy, but at 
the cost of a nonstandard plant configuration that takes engineering control 
away from the bridge watch team. 
Under the same conditions, the endurance of the DDG is strikingly different. 
Patrol time to 50 percent is just under 3 days at 13 knots, with about 5}12 days total 
to 30 percent fuel state. The DDG 5 1  class combat systems doctrine does not yet 
detail a low speed quiet mode configuration for the class; but if a setup similar to 
that for the cruiser is presumed, then endurance to 50 percent would be boosted 
by a day, and to 30 percent by 2 days, maintaining a patrol speed of 5 knots. Thus, at 
the lowest speed and lowest fuel state, the cruiser can remain on station more than 
1 }12  times as long as the destroyer. At a more responsive 1 3  knots and a more 
responsible 50 percent fuel state, the cruiser will have lasted twice as long as the 
destroyer-and will have done it with 35 percent more VLS cells . 
While this simplistic arithmetic shows the logic of selecting the cruiser for 
the NTW mission, it also helps to highlight one of the JFMCC's greatest logistical 
challenges: the iron logic of fuel. Warships have redundant weapons, redundant 
sensors, and plenty of manpower. When the fresh fruit and vegetables run out , a 
Navy ship's galley can still serve macaroni and cheese well into the next century. 
Fuel, however, is an absolute. Empires were built around coaling stations for 
good reason, and the NTW cruiser captain who finds himself at 30 percent fuel 
in the face of the enemy is not going to sleep well. 
To fight the theater ballistic missile defense battle efficiently, the Joint Force 
Maritime Component Commander should favor Navy Theater Wide systems, if 
he can. But in order to defend the DAL and also be prepared to establish an 
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amphibious objective area, he will also have to retain Navy Area assets for both 
endgame TBMD defense and conventional AW 
By the very geometry of their missions, NTW and Navy Area assets will tend 
to be widely separated, as they are best employed at opposite ends of a ballistic 
trajectory that may extend for hundreds of nautical miles. Under the umbrella of 
layered defense that they provide, other ships will go about other essential 
missions-and they will all need fuel. 
The days of the amphibious ready group and carrier battle group moving 
about the theater as near-contiguous blocs of military power and logistical 
organization have been over for some time, but the unique time-distance 
stressors associated with theater ballistic missile defense have the potential to 
overwhelm current ad hoc logistics solutions to dispersed tasking. Recent 
events, such as those involving AEGIS combatants in the Adriatic or 
UN-sanctioned maritime interdiction force (MIF) board-and-search operations 
in the northern Red Sea, have seen the frequent use of allied replenishment­
at-sea assets and unescorted US. auxiliaries. Examples include everything from a 
Canadian Forces oiler fueling the Red Crown AEGIS CG off Montenegro to a 
lone USNS T-AO rotating down to Hurghada, Egypt, to support the MIE In 
future contingencies involving TBMD, allied or coalition logistical support is not 
initially guaranteed and thus may not be counted upon to augment US. 
replenishment capability in theater at the very moment US. naval TBMD assets 
may be spread farthest and thinnest. 
Even as the theater develops, the fuel problem will remain challenging. In the 
Phase 2 (day 70) portion of the 2005+ scenario ofNTF Wargame 95B, eighteen 
TBMD-capable AEGIS combatants ranged the length and breadth of the 
Mediterranean and Aegean seas, escorting three CVNs, performing TLAM 
strikes and local AW, and conducting NTW and Navy Area patrols.63 
Replenishment was not simulated. 
If the enemy TBM effort against the defended asset list develops in a manner 
not anticipated by the jFMCC's initial resource allocation, then TBMD assets may 
have to be shifted rapidly, with the resulting full-power sprints consuming even 
more fuel. Knowing this, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 
must carefully evaluate his ability to carry out a robust, flexible TBMD plan while 
still providing his ships with sufficient fuel for safe operations and combat tasking. 
VLS Capabilities and Limitations: Reload and Loadout. A warship cannot live 
without fuel , but it cannot fight without ammunition. As weapons systems 
become increasingly complex and specialized, the ability of a weapons platform 
to execute a given missIOn is increasingly tied to its reserves of a specific 
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munition.  I f  the AEGIS CG demonstrates superior endurance for the remote 
NTW mission,  that advantage is squandered if the ship carries an insufficient 
loadout of NTW interceptors. 
If all its SM3 missiles are gone after two days on-station, the CG's superior fuel 
reserves are rendered irrelevant. Except as a sensor or cueing platform, the ship is 
useless for NTW and is probably out of position for any of the other missions it is 
potentially capable of performing. Furthermore, unlike fuel, VLS reloads cannot 
be provided on station . The ship must leave its patrol area and proceed to port, 
perhaps taking itself out of the fIght entirely. 
As originally designed, the Mk41 vertical launching system and its variants 
have a nominal underway replenishment capability. The practical limits of this 
capability are sufficiently great that in the late 1 980s, the Center for Naval 
Analyses (CNA) studied a series of possible improvements. The results of that 
study, driven by the old Soviet regimental raid threat, are still relevant in light of 
the emerging TBMD mission. 
Looking at older ship classes, CNA found that " typical rates  for the transfer of 
large missiles between ships at sea [were] on the order of two to six missiles per 
hour."" In regard to VLS, "limited t esting of the VLS UNREP system indicates 
the fleet can expect about 3 missiles  per hour as a consistent strike-down rate in 
calm seas (sea state 3 or less) ., ,65 
However, the two most important VLS munitions in the current inventory, 
Tomahawk and SM2 Block IV, cannot be transferred at sea at all, since they are 
several thousand pounds too heavy for the launcher-installed VLS handling 
crane. This problem first became a major issue during DESERT STORM, when 
hundreds of Tomahawks were launched in a matter of days, and entire VLS 
magazines had to be reloaded in theater. 
In the TLAM strike world, standard operating procedures were developed, 
tested , implemented, and finally incorporated in detail into the NWP 3-03 . 1 
series (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-C/D) Employment Manual) .66 
Referring to  TLAM rearmament procedures while discussing TBMD is 
instructive primarily because the logistical challenges of Tomahawk and TBMD 
missile size and weight are similar. The Mk 1 4  VLS canister for TLAM and the 
Mk21 canister for SM2 Block IV and its variants (including SM3) are the same 
size, and while TLAM will probably remain the heavier of the two missiles,  
encanistered weights are within 1 ,000 Ibs. of each other. 
NWP 3- 03 . 1 's rearming site requirements are clear: 
Rearming requires pierside handling facilities, airfields and airlift capability (lower 
volume and higher expense) , seaport and sealift capabilities (slower, higher vol­
ume, and lower expense) , and trucking from seaport or airfield to pierside . . . .  Any 
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ordnance-certified mobile crane with a "power-down" mode having sufficient 
rated capacity, boom length and hook height may be used to load . . . .  QR [Quick 
Reaction] teams may also be used to support loading and unloading operations at 
anchorage with a barge and floating crane or cross-decking operations with a de­
stroyer [tender] . 67 
How many tenders, both AD and AS, will the Navy actually have in 2008? 
Also left unstated is the fact that "double-ended" VLS ships such as AEGIS 
cruisers and destroyers can be rearmed twice as fast if two cranes are available (a 
frequent bone of contention at stateside weapons stations) . With both cranes 
swinging canisters and enough forklifts and pier-side handlers to keep up with 
them, a motivated AEGIS crew can completely reload the ship 's VLS systems in 
one (long) day. Note the optimum requirements, though: a pier of sufficient 
length and with water alongside to accommodate ships up to 5 63 feet long and 
32 + feet in draft;  cranes ,  forklifts, trucks, and/or flatbed rail rolling stock; and 
contiguous or near-contiguous cargo ports or airfields. Such a facility is precisely 
the kind of "logistics node" that the JFMCC will be attempting either to defend 
or seize early in a regional conflict. When in friendly hands, such a facility is a 
prime TBM target in its own right, as seen at Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, on 1 6  
February 1 99 1 ,  when an Iraqi Scud impacted within yards of an ammunition 
pier berthing seven ships ,  a supply barge, and the USS Tarawa.68 
Logistics for supplying the rearming site itself are daunting. If airlift is used to 
expedite VLS reloading, more than four dedicated C5 sorties will be needed to 
fully rearm a single AEGIS CG with TBMD and TLAM munitions. 69 What must 
be borne in mind, though, is that the AEGIS ship thus reloaded can then protect 
that same airfield in order to allow the 1 28 C5 sorties required to move a Patriot 
battalion into theater.7o Furthermore,  the Joint Force Commander will still be 
confronted with the reality of competing missions, only one of which is TBMD. 
The logistical challenges  associated with rearming VLS combatants in theater 
clarify the reason that current CONOPS tend to state that follow-on loads of 
VLS munitions will arrive in the magazines of deploying combatants. If VLS 
reloading or load "tailoring" via cross-decking will thus be difficult in an 
engaged theater of operations, then the initial loadout with which a VLS AEGIS 
ship departs home port is crucial to the combat effectiveness of that ship. 
By 2008 , there will be over 5 ,500 VLS cells arming the AEGIS combatants of 
the fleet.71 Competing for this finite space will be SM2 Block IVA, SM3, 4-missile 
packs of Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESSM) , vertical launch ASROC (VLA) , Tomahawk 
TLAM-C and 0 variants, and perhaps SM4 Standard load attack missiles. 
Only one of these missiles,  the Navy Area SM2 Block IVA, is a true 
multimission weapon ,  with capability against aircraft, cruise missiles, and theater 
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ballistic missiles. With single-mission weapons , however, initial VLS loadout is a 
zero-sum game. For every missile loaded to support Mission A, Mission B Ioses 
capability. 
One of the historical strengths of naval forces has been their ability to carry 
out a variety of missions. The maritime component is versatile, flexible, mobile 
and survivable, an adaptable "force package" for the JFMCC to task as required. 
There is thus a strong institutional prejudice toward mixed-mission loadouts for 
VLS AEGIS ships. These combatants were designed and built at great expense to 
do many missions and to do them all well . Furthermore, the true nature of any 
regional contingency seldom becomes clear before battle is joined. If maritime 
forces are to be first on the scene, then they must be capable of responding 
immediately to a variety of hostile challenges. 
This is all true-to a point. Mixed loadouts are appropriate,  but the theater 
CINC and the officers he may potentially task as Joint Force Commander and 
JFM CC should use peacetime intelligence preparation of the battle space as a 
tool to best match loadout to potential tasking for combatants prior to 
deployment. By 2008 , this will become a far more complex process than that 
which determines the current , common 70/30 loadout split between SM2 and 
TLAM. 
For example, if there is a significant long-range TBM threat in theater which 
can be leveraged by forward-positioned NTW, then consideration should be given 
to increasing the SM3 load percentage in AEGIS CGs deploying to that theater. 
The "Chinese puzzle" problem of shuilling VLS canisters around the battle group 
could be solved by shifting the TLAM and Navy Area missiles thus displaced to 
AEGIS DDGs, which in turn would be tasked with the brunt of potential Navy 
Area TBMD and strike missions. Every AEGIS combatant would retain the 
multimission Navy Area interceptor, but would otherwise "load the dice" with 
the single-mission missile best suited to a given ship type and the unique 
challenges of a particular deployment in a particular theater of operations. 
Command, Control, and Intelligence 
Issues of command and control contrast with issues of logistics because C2 
does not answer easily to the rational power of numbers. Considered in isolation, 
logistical problems lend themselves to mathematical solutions, to the 
computational clarity of operations analysis. This is not true of command in war. 
Van Creveld writes: "So far, I have spoken of command as if it were solely a 
rational process (or rather, a combination of processes) in which information is 
used to orchestrate men and things toward performing their missions in war. 
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This is not strictly true, however, since war is an irrational business par 
excellence."n A significant danger when studying any new and evolving form of 
warfare is to be seduced into oversimplification, into generalized force -on-force 
comparisons, into enumeration of technical characteristics rather than 
operational complexities. The purpose of discussing TBMD command, control,  
and intelligence issues is to muddy the waters upon which the preceding 
logistical arguments float,  and thus prepare the reader for the complex realities of 
warfighting that follow. 
The exercise of efficient and effective command and control in war finds its 
counterpart and helpmate in the decision-theory art of "satisficing,,,n a 
dynamic, ever-evolving cycle of demand and compromise which attempts to 
counteract the fog of war by resolving internal conflicts. These may be conflicts 
of mission, conflicts of tasking, conflicts of rank, conflicts caused by lack of data, 
or even conflicts stemming from information overload. The commander who 
exercises effective command and control is the commander who can best resolve 
the incessant tension be tween conflicting missions and limited means, a tension 
which is inherent in all military operations. 
This tension will affect the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander at 
three levels: above him, at the JFCICINC/NCA level, where theater ballistic missile 
defense will be highly visible ; at the theater level, where the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander must work out initial TBMD plans in competition with 
other missions and prepare for the eventual shift of the AADC and/ or JFACC roles 
ashore; and at the individual unit level, where the JFMCC must balance the 
importance and visibility of the TBMD mission with the distinctly limited 
number of naval platforms and interceptor missiles initially present in theater. 
The resolution of these tensions associated with competing tasking and levels 
of command must take place under the rubric of mission, the overall intent of 
the CINC and Joint Force Commander. Finally, the potential impact of theater 
ballistic missile defense on that mission can only be evaluated through the 
rigorous execution and thorough understanding of the TBMD -related 
intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB) . 
Political Nature of TBMD: C2 up the Chain of Command. The asymmetric 
power granted an aggressor through possession of TBM capability elicits an 
asymmetric response from those threatened by that power. The hundre ds of 
ScudCap missions flown over the western desert of Iraq during DESERT 
STORM , the redeployment of Joint Special Operations Command aSOC) 
special mission assets, and the dozens of C5 sorties flown to support a 
rudimentary TBMD are a defense capability for Israel stand as testimony to this. 
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In 2008 , the captain of an NTW-capable AEGIS cruiser positioned for 
ascent-phase intercept off the North African littoral could well find his single 
ship defending many of the capitals of southern Europe against attack by nuclear, 
biological, or chemical-capable TBMs. 74 This degree of threat , and the potential 
leverage of a single ship against that threat , will resonate up the chain-of­
command in a way that the conventional air warfare mission never has. The Joint 
Force Maritime Component Commander must anticipate both support and 
interference commensurate with that resonance. How he deals with this 
inevitable phenomenon will directly affect his ability to support the Joint Force 
Commander, both with theater ballistic missile defense and with the other 
essential missions under his purview. 
The netted battle management command, control, communications, 
computers, and intelligence (BMC4I) architecture assumed for a 2008 scenario 
will be vital to the efficient execution of the theater ballistic missile defense 
mission, but will inevitably affect the freedom of action of every level of the 
chain of command, making each subject to the guidance of all levels above, 
delivered in real time. Nelson could not have gotten away with holding his long 
glass to his blind eye if First Sea Lord Sir John Jervis had been sitting at a joint 
maritime command information system QMCIS) terminal in Whitehall . 
Indeed, to chafe at such centralized oversight has been an identifying trait of 
naval components throughout history. In the joint context, however, and 
especially in regard to joint theater ballistic missile defense, centralized, 
high-level "meddling" is both inevitable and understandable, for theater ballistic 
missiles are uniquely "political" weapons and have been so since the first V-2s 
smashed into the streets John Jervis once walked. 
In the simplest terms, the mission of theater ballistic missile defense forces is 
to safeguard areas on the theater defended assets list (DAL) as prioritized by the 
CINC and Joint Force Commander. It is instructive that at National Test Facility 
Wargame 95B, whose TBMD portion simulated the defense of southern Europe 
against a WMD-capable TBM threat from the Levant and North Mrican littoral, 
the first priority on the DAL was the regional national capitals target set, 
followed by major friendly population centers, with the defense of military 
targets a distinct third. Similarly, in the Global '95 game, limited NTW assets 
were completely expended in the Northeast Asian MRC defending the 
population centers of an essential ally at the direction of the National Command 
Authority.7s These game results acknowledge the primacy of political centers of 
gravity in the TBM target set. The Joint Force Maritime Component 
Commander must be prepared to deal with the consequences. 
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Military forces possessing unique capabilities related to political centers of 
gravity tend to see their command and control architectures "stovepipe "  toward 
centralized control by the National Command Authority. Strategic nuclear 
forces assigned to the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) or 
special mission units assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command aSOC) 
of the United S tates Special Operations Command (USSO COM) come 
immediately to mind. Naval forces have traditionally been resistant to such 
centralized consolidation of control, as seen in the debate over the ballistic 
missile submarine force during the post-Cold War creation of USSTRATCOM, 
the preservation of a degree of naval special warfare autonomy within 
USSOCOM, and, during the years that nuclear Tomahawk was deployed, the 
designation of that weapon as "tactical" -thus keeping the ships and submarines 
carrying it under Navy control. 
To this day, naval doctrine espouses flexibility and individual initiative based 
on a clear understanding of mission .  Indeed,  Naval Doctrine Publication 6, "Naval 
Command and Control:' cites historical precedent and states: 
Armed with an understanding of their senior's intent, the subordinate command­
ers were expected to conduct a wide range of operations on their own initiative. 
This style of command has been an enduring characteristic of naval op erations 
and continues to distinguish the way naval commanders exercise command and 
control today.7. 
While acknowledging the spirit of independent initiative that lies at the soul 
of the naval service, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander must 
grapple intellectually with the fact that modern command and control 
technology will inevitably erode that independence. In the specific arena of 
naval TBMD, especially high-leverage Theater Wide defense, that erosion will be 
accelerated due to the overarching political importance of particular targets to 
be defended. NTW assets may well come under the direct control of the Joint 
Force Commander, the CINC, or even the NCA; and as a theater matures, the 
]FACC and AADC may well be consolidated-potentially putting those same 
ships at the beck and call of an Air Force general ashore. 
The details of such command relationships represent novel arrangements for 
both the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander and the surface Navy. 
The potential of naval TBMD is so great ,  though, that conventional notions of 
naval autonomy must be respected only insofar as they bring to bear the 
maximum effect of these new capabilities. As with other naval assets of 
recognized political or strategic importance, such as ballistic missile submarines 
since their introduction and carner battle groups in recent decades,  
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corrunanders of naval surface assets may well have to adjust familiar 
arrangements to cope with new challenges. Theater ballistic missiles represent 
such a challenge in our age, a challenge which may require development and 
acceptance of new corrunand and control relationships for maritime forces. To 
do otherwise is to risk marginalizing key naval capabilities in future conflicts. 
The degree of connectivity and consultation demanded by the NCA for the 
theater ballistic missile defense mission may well exceed that now associated 
with sensitive special operations and peacetime TLAM strikes. When tasked as 
Area Air Defense Corrunander, the Joint Force Maritime Component 
Corrunander will be responsible to the Joint Force Corrunander for TBMD 
active defense plans. These plans will have their basic grounding in the 
theater-specific TMD CONOPS, which in turn will be based on joint doctrine 
and joint CONOPS. 
CONOPS are by their very nature quite general, and plans, by necessity, are 
specific. The ability to articulate the plan up the chain of command will be an 
essential skill for the Joint Force Maritime Component Corrunander if he is to 
preserve a degree of autonomy. Specific TBMD knowledge above the theater 
level may well be based on CONOPS, leading to a constant chorus of secure 
SATCOM and teleconferencing in search of clarification and detail. The Joint 
Force Maritime Component Corrunander cannot avoid this, and should not 
attempt to forestall it by flooding unsolicited detail up the chain in a preemptive 
attempt to remain unfettered. He must plan for an ongoing, interactive dialogue 
unique to this particular mission, a dialogue perhaps best handled by a dedicated 
TBMD cadre on his staff. 
Much as in special operations or TLAM mission planning, a small team set up 
as a dedicated node of corporate knowledge at every level of the chain of 
corrunand can facilitate understanding and clarity of purpose, and decrease 
confusion and repetition when discussing the mission in real time. If the Joint 
Force Maritime Component Commander can thus aggressively and lucidly 
detail his plan and his progress up the chain , he decreases the very real risk that 
he will be bypassed down the chain by the NCA giving rudder orders directly to 
the captain of an NTW AEGIS cruiser. 
Competing Missions: C2 at the Theater Level. During an emerging crisis in an 
undeveloped theater, facing a TBM-armed, WMD-capable adversary, the Joint 
Force Corrunander may assign duties as both Area Air Defense Commander and 
Joint Force Air Component Commander to the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander. If substantial U.S.  Air Force assets are already 
positioned in theater, the JFACC could well be separate, although the Joint Force 
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Maritime Component Commander might retain Area Air Defense 
Commander responsibilities due to his force 's naval theater ballistic missile 
defense capability and mobile, survivable , carrier-based air power. As operations 
progress and the theater matures,  the cycle may be completed by the Joint Force 
Maritime Component Commander relinquishing Area Air Defense 
Commander duties to the JFACC ashore . The point of these permutations is 
simple :  if the JFMCC is likely to be the pivotal component commander in the 
crucial early stages of a conflict involving theater ballistic missile defense ,  then he 
must pay particular attention to the complex relationship and competing 
operational prerogatives of the Area Air Defense Commander and the Joint 
Force Air Component Commander. 
When facing theater ballistic missiles, the moment of greatest danger occurs 
early in the conflict, due to the likely mismatch of offense and defense. The 
enemy TBM inventory will be at its maximum, while U.S. theater ballistic 
missile defense assets will for the moment be limited to those deployed in 
theater, unless a lengthy (and unlikely) pre-hostilities period has allowed an 
unopposed friendly force buildup. "Naval TBMD provides the earliest capability 
just when the heaviest TBM attack intensity is likely, and when other TBMD 
systems are still en route or present only in small numbers ., , 77 Such a "window of 
vulnerability" starkly highlights the conflicting missions of the JFACC and 
AADC, a conflict which the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 
must be able to resolve. 78 
The basic dichotomy is that of offense and defense. The nature of modern 
offensive operations drives air planners to seek diverse target sets that have a 
synergistic effect when struck simultaneously (e.g. , local C2 nodes in 
combination with a regional power grid) . The goal is to enhance combat 
effectiveness by conducting parallel operations to the full depth of the theater, 
shocking the enemy with a pulse of power rather than by incremental attacks 
delivered sequentially. In pursuit of decisive concentration, this style of 
operation demands a certain "critical mass" of aircraft and cruise missiles in 
order to bring an adequate weight of metal to bear on enough targets in a 
sufficiently short period of time. The Joint Target Coordination Board and the 
Joint Target List are e stablished to ensure the optimum employment of this 
critical mass. 
However, in the operational circumstance where the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander is most likely to be designated as JFACC and Area Air 
Defense Commander, available str ike assets will by definition be limited, 
primarily to the aircraft on the one or more carriers in theater, and the 
Tomahawk inventories in the VLS magazmes of their escorts. These same 
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VLS-capable combatants will be desperately needed to  redress the early theater 
ballistic missile defense window of vulnerability, as will be JFACC-controlled 
TBMD attack operations sorties. 
The joint target list and the defended assets list will thus be set in opposition 
to each other. It  will be up to the triple-hattedJFMCC/JFACCI AADC to cut this 
Gordian knot while simultaneously discharging traditional naval component 
missions such as SLOC protection,  CV escort , maritime interdiction force (MIF) 
operations, USW; MIW; and protection of MPS assets as they arrive in theater. The 
challenge is accentuated by the inevitability oflimited assets and exacerbated by 
the improbability that these diverse tasks will be geographically compatible for 
any given placement of the force asse ts. 
Strike units and those conducting reconnaissance and USW I MIW 
sanitization of potential amphibious objective areas will tend to be well forward. 
NTW assets will patrol large "areas of negation: '  TBMD launch baskets covering 
thousands of square miles, dynamically determined and continuously reshaped 
by automated planning tools evaluating enemy TBM disposition ,  capability, and 
an optimum defended footprint .79 Units protecting the DAL as Navy Area 
platforms will be restricted to rigidly limited patrol areas as goalkeeper for a 
particular target. Ships conducting escort and logistics support missions must be 
able to range the full depth of the theater. 
The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander is unlikely to have 
enough ships, aircraft ,  and VLS cells to fully service the joint target list , provide 
initial defense-in-depth to the DAL, and prepare both his forces and an AOA for 
power projection operations ashore. He must , in effect, continually prioritize 
and subject to risk analysis all of his subordinate missions as JFACC, AADC, and 
Maritime Component Commander in order to best support the overall intent of 
the Joint Force Commander. 
The JFMCC must be utterly forthright in assessing his own capabilities and 
evaluating the tasking given him from above. If theater ballistic missile defense is 
a priority, and his forces are spread too thinly over the DAL, he must call for 
either more assets or a reduction in the defended target set . 
To this end, a precise delineation of mission,  from the CINC through the Joint 
Force Commander to the JFMCC, is essential, so that the Maritime Component 
Commander may reconcile his conflicting responsibilities through a clear 
statement of commander's intent .  That statement also will provide guidance and 
continuity when and if the Joint Force Air Component Commander and Area 
Air Defense Commander duties shift to other service components later in the 
campaIgn. 
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Some of the lessons thus incorporated are directly applicable to the NTW 
nusslon. 
At least one real-world TLAM contingency mission in recent years would 
have failed if assigned to a single ship. Last minute combat systems casualties 
were operationally overcome by the use of a mutually supporting backup 
shooter, who successfully fired the mission. The same principles apply to 
high-leverage, high-visibility NTW tasking. If the ship designated to engage 
cannot get the shot off-for whatever reason-a second cruiser sharing the 
TBM track via the ]CTN can respond immediately in accordance with 
established AEGIS TBMD doctrine and thus preserve as much of the 
intercept/kill evaluation/refire decision time line as possible. 
With so much potentially riding on NTW, the ]FMCC should give serious 
consideration to the TAG team concept. The extra assets c ommitted may 
dramatically increase the likelihood of mission success. 
Amphibious Objective Area Pro tection : USMC Concerns. While the unique 
characteristics and challenges of Navy Theater Wide defense help illustrate the 
central TBMD theme of resolving conflicting missions and limited means, Navy 
Area defense must not be neglected. It is a complementary rather than an 
inferior capability, and it is essential to the pivotal TBMD tene t  of layered 
defense. In specific areas of the Joint Force Commander's operational concept 
and intent, it may indeed dominate TBM D  planning. Amphibious operations 
represent just such an area. 
As DESERT STORM demonstrated, amphibious assault is not necessarily 
required for successful power projection against a littoral objective . Indeed, as 
critics of the Marine Corps never tire of pomting out, a maj or opposed landing 
has not been attempted by U.S. forces  since Inchon, which by 2008 will have 
rec eded more than half a century into history. However, the successful 
conclusion of conflict will often require the introduction of ground forces onto 
hostile territory, and those ground forces will increasingly require protection 
from both air-breathing threats (e. g. , aircraft and cruise missiles) and ballistic 
missiles, protection which Navy Area ships can provide until land-based systems 
are in place to shoulder the defensive burden. 
In a perverse twist of operational logic, the gradual spread of TBMs and 
persistent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may in fact revive the 
utility of some types of amphibious operations. One of the centers of gravity 
which WMD tend to hold at risk is the power projection force itself. Large, 
relatively fixed, land-force buildups, such as took place in Saudi Arabia prior to 
the beginning of the DESERT STORM ground war, are clearly vulnerable if 
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The TAG concept, however, has operational value that is greater than the sum 
of its parts for reasons that go beyond mutual defense and enhanced TBM 
engagement. The mundane realities of required maintenance, systems 
limitations and real-world reliability are equally important. 
The essential sensor for naval TBMD engagements until well into the next 
century will be the Spy radar. Versatile , capable, and reliable, various versions 
will have been in service with the fleet for more than twenty years by 2008. Like 
any complex sensor, though, Spy requires maintenance. The primary radar of an 
AEGIS ship is not brought on line at the beginning of a deployment and secured 
six months later. The systems test officer (STO) on a cruiser would like a few 
hours out of every seventy-two with the radar down for maintenance. Various 
"work-arounds:' such as shutting down the forward or aft arrays only, and then 
maneuvering the ship to ensure coverage of the likely threat axis, are possible ; 
but these are stopgap measures, and the system will eventually degrade. 
Thus, if a single ship is assigned to an NTW patrol area, the JFM CC is 
confronted with a simple but serious dilemma. In order to remain fully mission 
capable, Spy must shut down periodically. Whenever it does, a p ortion of the 
DAL is put at risk for the duration of the maintenance period. Furthermore, if 
the NTW ship is optimally stationed well forward, an adept enemy may well 
detect the moment that Spy secures and thus be able to exploit the resulting 
window of vulnerability of both the DAL and the ship itself. 
The cruiser has redundant systems which will decrease its own vulnerability, 
such as the SPS-49 air search radar, EW and chaff systems, CIWS, Harpoon, and 
the SPQ-9 radar incorporated in the Mk86 gun fire control system (GFCS) . 
Good technicians, given warning, can also bring Spy out of maintenance 
quickly. However, the timeline of TBMD engagements is so challenging that 
even the most agile combat systems team may not be able to bring the radar back 
up and generate the required high-power waveforms quickly enough once a 
TBM launch is remotely detected and cueing data is passed to the ship. 
Two ships in mutual support can decrease the impact of both planned Spy 
maintenance and the inevitable, unexpected component failures which occur in 
even the best maintained complex combat systems. Additionally, the redundant 
radar coverage thus provided will allow continuous NTW coverage during 
evolutions such as LAMPS launch and recovery, and underway replenishment, all 
of which require temporary degradation of Spy coverage by the ship involved. 
Finally, the concept of a backup shooter for critical launch operations has 
been validated for years by TLAM CONOPS. TLAM pubs such as the NWP 
3-03 . 1 series serve as useful examples of how a related mission has been 
exhaustively analyzed and addressed in light of actual operational experience. 
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available for horizon search and other functions. This is not a new 
phenomenon-but the unique demands of TBMD tend to exacerbate the 
problem. A Navy requirement for TBMD enhancement of the AEGIS combat 
system is the ability to perform TBM engagements and self-defense 
concurrently; but TBM tracks will still require a significant percentage of total 
radar energy and processing power. 
The human factor must also be considered. If a given NTW ship is responsible 
for the defense of a dozen key political targets and population centers on the 
DAL, all threatened by the WMD-capable missiles of a bellicose regional power, 
the attention of the CIC watch team will understandably gravitate toward the 
TBMD mission . If it does not, vociferous SATCOM consultations between the 
JFMCC and the cruiser CO will make it so. Training, doctrine,  and deckplate 
professionalism can resist-but probably not overcome-such tactical tunnel 
vision . Under these circumstances, it will be prudent to have a heavily armed 
partner helping with the close-in threat. 
The scouting and USW capability inherent in the dual helicopter SH-60 
LAMPS detachment organic to each cruiser, plus LAMPS HAWKLINK, the j oint 
data net,  TBMD cueing from space-based sensors,  and the track-sharing 
capability of the CEC-derived JCTN, will allow effective mutual support from 
well over the horizon. The lower the non-TBM threat, the more this baseline 
can be lengthened. Such separation of TAG platforms allows extended 
cooperative tracking of TBMs, as shown in the RED TIGRESS test of 1 993 ,94 the 
USACOM JTF-95 TBM exercise in August 1 9 94 and cooperative engagement 
capability workups of the Eisenhower battle group,95 and more recent PACFLT 
extende d  tracking exercises during 1 99 5 . 96 The resulting increased tracking time 
will facilitate multiple NTW shot opportunities and improve the timeline for kill 
assessment. If, for some reason, space-based TBM launch cueing is not available,  
cooperative tracking by NTW ships will be vital in order to preserve an 
engagement window constrained by the time lost between TBM launch and first 
detection by the forwardmost Spy radar. 
Looking toward 2008, evolutionary advances in enemy TBM technology will 
likely reduce reentry vehicle radar cross-section. Cooperative tracking by NTW 
ships on a widely spaced baseline can help overcome the RCS challenge posed 
by more advanced high-b allistic-coefficient ("skinny and pointy") separating 
RVs, by simultaneously radiating multiple aspects of the target and using a track 
derived from the strongest return. Such a capability also helps hedge against the 
eventual deployment of penetration aids on more advanced TBM systems and 
will facilitate kill assessment against any TBM following intercept. 
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prep ackaged in discrete units-ships. With a limited number of ships available in 
theater, and a limited number of potential reinforcements  to bolster them, the 
JFMCC must constantly weigh the relative leverage a given mission allows him 
against the number of ships required to accomplish that mission. 
In a force-on-force analysis, Navy Theater Wide TBMD capability often 
appears to give th e JFMCC great leverage, with a single ship defending multiple 
targets on the DAL. That leverage, though,  must be tempered by the real-world 
complications of other warfare areas and multiple hostile threats, the impact of 
systems reliability issues,  and the concomitant requirement for systems 
maintenance even in the face of the enemy. 
That said, the defensive leverage ofNTW remains and is p oten tially so great 
that the JFMCC may wish to consider providing a robust, survivable capability 
through the use of de dicated, mutually supporting asse ts, a TBMD Action 
Group (or TAG Team) . Such a conc ept i s  re ally a spe cialized maritime version 
of th e generic Ballistic Mis sil e Defense Organization construct of the active 
defense group (ADG) , "comprising relatively autonomous package s of both 
sensors and shooters . . . .  In general, these ADGs were assumed to possess all of 
the capabilities re quire d to detect, acquire, track, engage, and kill hostile 
missiles ., , 93  
The advantages that accrue when two NTW ships are assigned to a single 
NTW patrol area are signiftcant. Intuitively obvious is the doubling of VLS 
inventory and the potential for mutual support in a multithreat environment. 
Additionally, if continuous NTW defensive coverage is to be guaranteed, the 
vital issues of systems maintenance and equipment casualties can be dealt with 
meaningfully only by two identical platforms operating in concert. 
The NTW mission is best carried out in proximity to the enemy. A littoral foe 
sufficiently advanced to field long-range TBMs can probably comprehend the 
significance of Spy radar emissions detected by his coastal EW site s. Depending 
on the nature of the aggressor and the charact eristics of the operating area, 
threats posed in opposition to an NTW cruiser could include diesel submarine s, 
ASCM-armed fast patrol boats, mines,  shore-based AS CMs,  strike aircraft, or even 
unconventional stratagems such as special operations forces  deploye d from 
merchant vessels, fishing craft, minisubs or fast motorboats. As in aerial combat, 
diverse challenges can best be met by two platforms covering each other while 
exe cuting the primary mission. 
Secondly, the advantage s of mutual support are define d not only by the nature 
of th e threat , but also by the nature of the sensors critical for TBMD. SPY radar 
energy is a finite quantity. As more and more of it is " squeezed" into the 
specialized waveforms required for TBM detection and tracking, less will be 
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Decreasing the inherent friction between NTW and strike will require the 
close cooperation of the AADC and the JFACC, respectively responsible for 
TBMD and TLAM operations. If these duties all devolve upon the JFMCC early 
in the conflict, so much the better, one might say, for this would allow unity of 
command to foster unity of effort. A "first-cut" on the degree of mission overlap 
can be achieved by comparing the most likely TLAM launch baskets with the 
most likely NTW areas of negation as established by the Tomahawk mission 
distribution system theater mission library, peacetime intelligence preparation of 
the battle space, and the automated TBMD planning tool resident in the JPN. If 
these expanses of ocean are mutually exclusive-in effect,  Venn diagrams which 
do not overlap-then strike evidently will be a dedicated mission perhaps best 
apportioned to a mix ofDD-963 and DDG-S 1 combatants, with NTW tasked to 
CGs. Ideally, these cruisers will have been loaded out with a reduced TLAM VLS 
cell count in order to increase their SM3 capacity. 
If, however, there is significant launch basket/area of negation overlap, the 
AADC and JFACC have something to work with and can attempt an 
accommodation.  For example, how is the DAL affected if NTW ship s patrol 
only that portion of an area of negation which overlaps TLAM launch 
baskets?  How can th e JFACC adjust Tomahawk missions so  that the  size of  
those launch baske ts is increased to give maximum coverage of  NTW patrol 
areas? 
If NTW ships can still patrol effectively within a TLAM launch area, the 
JFACC and his Tomahawk strike coordinator can maximize the utility of such 
TLAM as remain in the cruiser VLS cells by assigning these ship s strike missions 
which allow large launch baskets. TLAM mission profiles which use GPS 
primary guidance, or which do not require enhanced time-on-target control or 
precision strike Tomahawk (PST) capability, and which do not require 
maximum range flight past the first preplanned waypoint (FPPWP) , tend to 
increase the size of the useable launch basket . 92 
Neither strike nor NTW can be considered in isolation. When their 
distinguishing sources of friction Oaunch baskets versus areas of negation) are 
rigorously compared, areas of friction can perhaps be resolved into areas of 
overlap, with multimission capability thus enhanced. The JFMCC must ensure 
that a comprehensive, cooperative comparison of mission characteristics and 
operational objectives is made , both at the theater level and by his subordinate 
commanders. 
TBMD Action Group (TAG) Concept for NTW. The Maritime Component 
Commander's means to carry out a variety of missions come to him 
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In a theater where the TBMD mission will be leveraged by both NTW and 
Navy Area, logistical considerations of endurance and magazine capacity will 
cause the CG to be favored for NTW tasking. Reduced radar cross-section and 
improved track processing in the littoral enviro nment provided by the 
SPY-1 D (V) radar may cause the DDG to be favored for the AOA support role. For 
this mission, the DDG's lack of organic helicopter capability is offset by the 
ability to provide support and an agile staging deck for the diverse rotary wing 
assets of the ARC. The DDG's less robust fuel endurance, which could be a 
critical liability on detached NTW patrol, may be of no consequence when 
operating with the battle group in the CV escort role. Both classes of AEGIS ship 
are versatile, powerful, and highly capable . The JFMCC and his battle group 
commanders must constantly review the overall intent of their tasking and 
ensure that class-specific capabilities are focused to best effect .  
Whe n  potential friction is inherent in a mission rath er than b eing a 
by-product of platform characteristics ,  the JFMCC must look more closely. 
Two critical missions that will conflict regardless of ship type will b e  NTW 
TBMD an d TLAM strike . Both require ships forward-positioned in 
circumscrib e d  launch areas, an d b oth require dedicated ,  competing VLS 
capacity. Friction thus exists at the outset and must be resolve d by the JFM CC 
and his subordinate s. 
This inevitable operational friction between strike tasking and NTW defe nse 
will be severe. The improved WDU-36 warhead fitt ed to the Block III  TLAM-C 
is still only a 1 ,000 lb.-equivalent weapon and is therefore most effective in 
massed strikes by one or more ships, potentially using a significant portion of 
their available VLS capacity. Launch timelines and time-on-target windows tend 
to be rigorous in order to achieve maximum effect from a given "pulse" of 
striking power. Thus, timely arrival in designated TLAM launch baskets is 
critical, closely monitored by the JFACC and his Tomahawk strike coordinator 
(TSC) . The resulting ship-wide tactical focus on strike, from receipt of the first 
INDIGO tasking message until the last Tomahawk drops its booster and 
transitions to cruise flight , does not contribute to the expeditious execution of 
the equally challenging NTW mission. 
Of course, the impact ofTLAM on TBMD can be ameliorated by maximizing 
the use of D D-963 platforms as strike assets; but unless the conditions of the 
conflict are extremely permissive, or enemy capabilities distinctly limited, the 
Sprnance-class destroyers will still re quire AW protection. Furthermore, by 2008 , 
the lead ship of this revolutionary class will have served for more than three 
decades .  Increasingly, the preponderance of the fleet's VLS capability will be 
carr ied by AEGIS ships. 
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and MIW For NTW ships in far-forward ascent phase intercept areas of negation, 
the capabilities of enemy fast patrol boats, coastal surveillance, maritime strike, 
and shore-based ASCM batteries must also be considered. For all AEGIS ships, 
historical data regarding local meteorological impact on Spy radar propagation 
and Navy Area interceptor infrared seeker performance should be included in 
the planning process. IPB is iterative, a constantly evolving game of "what if?" 
designed to reveal answers to issues driven by enemy capabilities and actions.91 
Comprehensive intelligence preparation allows the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander to better anticipate possible enemy courses of action 
and to exercise effective command and control to counter them. 
Warfighting 
If the great strength of naval combatants lies in their innate ability to perform 
many different missions, then one of the greatest challenges facing the Maritime 
Component Commander will be to prioritize those missions in support of the 
Joint Force Commander's operational intent, and apportion his limited assets 
accordingly. To do so, both effectively and efficiently, the JFMCC must have a 
clear understanding of the operational capabilities and limitations of his 
combatants, and the zones of friction which exist between their competing 
IIllSSlons. 
Reality of Competing Missions. The degree of mutual interference between 
competing missions varies with the protean nature of conflict. A DDG providing 
Navy Area protection to an amphibious objective area may also be able to support 
Marines ashore with its 5-inch gun, and fire SM2 missiles to destroy enemy aircraft 
counterattacking the beachhead. That same DDG, tasked to provide Navy Area 
coverage for a vital port while land-based TBMD systems are off-loaded and made 
ready, may not be able to support the JFMCC with any other mission. 
Such tradeoffs are difficult to anticipate and must be dealt with as operations 
progress and requirements become clear. What operational planners can do in 
anticipation of regional contingencies is to try to illuminate constants, "first 
principles" of mission overlap and conflict that do not tend to vary (or tend to 
vary less) as the specifics of a given contingency change. 
One such constant is the mission capability of different platforms. Missions 
themselves are mutable ,  but ships and their associated systems are known and 
quantifiable. Conflict and friction between overlapping missions can be 
decreased if an optimum match between platform and mission is sought. 
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control engagements only under rare circumstances, such as defending against 
known WMD.,,85 
The theater ballistic missile defense plan should seek to position NTW 
shooters as far forward as possible to shorten the TBM-launch to first-intercept 
time line. NTW kill assessment will depend on "tactical telemetry in all missile 
stages and recording of essential AEGIS systems data. Additionally, it will include 
telemetry of kill vehicle seeker imagery to the firing ship.,,86 Consummation of 
an NTW intercept can take several minutes. Developing a plan to take advantage 
of early intercept opportunities will increase time available for kill assessment, 
and decrease pressure on other units to launch. 
Preplanned responses to a "positive-no-kill" determination should follow 
sequentially in accordance with doctrine all the way to the area defense 
endgame so that no TBMD shooter along the target's trajectory is forced to 
fire-by-default and thus chance wasting missiles. "Decisions could be based on 
pre-established algorithms for maximizing engagement opportunities against 
specific targets or for maintaining balanced inventories.,, 87 
If correctly designed and promulgated to TBMD units through mission-style 
orders, the Area Air Defense Commander's theater ballistic missile defense plan 
should be capable of execution with minimal direct intervention. The AADC is 
then free to coordinate decentralized execution of the plan by remotely 
monitoring remaining VLS inventories, observing the enemy level of effort 
against the DAL, and realigning his forces as necessary as the battle progresses. 
Intelligence Preparation of the TBMD Battle Space: "The days, weeks and 
months preceding hostilities must be used to plan, prepare and organize for the 
exe cution of TMD active defense, which is accomplished in terms of minutes 
and seconds.,,·8 Execution of the theater missile defense intelligence preparation 
of the battle space is the responsibility of the Area Air Defense Commander."9 If 
the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander is tasked as the AADC, this 
vital work will devolve upon him to include the complex TBMD subset of 
theater missile defense intelligence preparation. 
As component commander for the theater ballistic missile defense assets 
likely to be first committed, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 
must use intelligence as a vital adjunct to enhance his ability to exercise effective 
TBMD command and control. The Naval Doctrine Command cites five 
elements comprising IPB : 
• Battle space evaluation defines the area of operations and focuses intelligence 
asse ts on the battle space . 
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duty, maritime interdiction force patrol, and TLAM strike may not be in position 
for either Navy Area or NTW tasking. Finally, real-world equipment 
performance must be taken into account. The demonstrated reliability of even 
the best complex systems is somewhat less than 1 00 percent .  
Thus, once the Joint Force Commander and Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander have completed their initial appraisal of the Defended 
Assets List and Joint Target List , and have decided what portion of the available 
naval component can be dedicated to theater ballistic missile defense (or can 
conduct TBMD tasking while executing other missions) , the jFMCC will find 
his actual engagement capability to be much more modest. When set against the 
likelihood of a preemptive main effort by enemy TBM forces,  the need for 
rigorous fire discipline becomes obvious. 
With individually guided interceptors such as SM2 Blk IVA and SM3, the 
probability of kill, P k '  against an incoming target does not vary directly in 
accordance with the number of rounds in the air, as it would with VT-fuzed 
"dumb" projectiles from antiaircraft artillery. Blackening the sky with missiles 
may possibly boost Pk incrementally, but it will surely deplete VLS cells 
drastically. The netted C2 architecture projected for 2008 is correctly seen as the 
key to a solution for this problem; but the Joint Force Maritime Component 
Commander should reflect carefully on how he chooses to use the capabilities 
that the joint planning net , joint data net, and joint composite tracking net will 
give him. 
The traditional naval response to limited SAM inventories has been close 
control of the inner air battle-in effect circling the wagons and having the 
Force Air Warfare Commander issue "take" orders. If the joint data net and joint 
composite tracking net are implemented as currently planned, the Joint Force 
Maritime Component Commander (as AADC) could conceivably do the same 
for the theater ballistic missile defense battle. This is not the intent of the netted 
C2 architecture. 
The TBMD battle is likely to be fluid,  dispersed, and sporadic, flurries of rapid 
launches followed by varying periods of quiet, as TELs attempt to relocate , 
rearm, and hide from attack operations forces. Fluid conditions in battle are best 
dealt with by tactical formations having good communications, a thorough 
grasp of doctrine ,  and mission-type orders that allow them maximum flexibility 
in achieving coordinated decentralized execution of the commander's intent. In 
the context of theater ballistic missile defense, fire discipline must derive from 
doctrine and planning rather than from centralized control by the Area Air 
D efense Commander. "The AADC will invoke positive control procedures to 
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Fire Discipline and Effective Difense : Unit Level C2. In future conflict ,  several 
factors may motivate aggressors to use their TBM capability early. First is the 
intuitively obvious theater ballistic missile defense window of vulnerability. 
TBMD interceptor inventory in theater is unlikely to be initially robust , 
especially when spread over a DAL encompassing political as well as military 
targets. 
The other significant motivator for early TBM use is a relic of strategic 
deterrence theory-the threat of "use it or lose it., , 80 In the Cold War c ontext of 
nuclear-armed ICBMs, the increasing need to launch quickly and early in any 
given exchange was directly proportional to the enemy's hard target 
"silo-busting" capability. In the context of TBMs, the equivalent of silo-busting 
is attack operations, the pillar of joint TBMD that seeks out and destroys missiles, 
transporter-erect or-launchers (TELs) , and support vehicles on the ground. 
Joint exercises such as the Roving Sands series show that much work remains 
to be done in this difficult area. However, evolving sensor-to-shooter 
capabilities, new systems such as the pod-mounted APG-76 synthetic aperture 
radar for attack aircraft,8! and geo-predictive databases such as GALE (generic 
area limitation environment) ,82 developed and deployed by DIA, all show that 
the relative immunity of the DESERT STORM-era Scud TEL is eroding quickly. 
Any potential enemy with a fundamental grasp of the open literature will 
appreciate that by 2008, U. S. attack operations capabilities will pose a significant 
threat to his TBM forces. Thus, if the correlation of offense and defense will be 
favorable to him before U.S. capabilities in theater can build up, and he 
understands that attack operations will become increasingly effective as those 
forces build up, he will be sorely tempted t o launch early and often . 
The initial JFMCC force structure for the 2005 + phase ofNTF Wargame 95B 
showed an "AEGIS-rich" CVBG composition that included four DDGs and two 
CGs per battle group. 83 A nominal VLS capacity for such a force is easily 
determined. Credit 90 cells to each DDG and 1 22 to each cruiser. Allow four 
cells each for vertical launch ASROC, and apportion the remaining cells 70 
percent/30 percent for SM2/3 and TLAM.84 This gives 60 available non-TLAM 
cells in each DDG, and 82 in each CG. In a battle group with four DDGs and two 
CGs, the grand total will be over 400 VLS cells available for air warfare (AW) and 
TBMD missiles. 
This is initially impressive, but deliberately simple-minded. Navy Area ships 
must, in effect, be collocated with the DAL assets they are defending, while Navy 
Theater Wide engagements are best conducted close to the TBM launch point 
in order to attempt intercept in the ascent phase. Ships assigned the many other 
missions of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, including escort 
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they fall within the range of WMD-capable TBM systems. Operational 
maneuver from the sea can give the Joint Force Commander potential 
alternatives.  
A recent RAND Corporation study of the implications of regional nuclear 
proliferation states: "An overwhelming operational need is to engage the 
regional opponent with forces that can operate effectively from beyond the 
enemy missile range or independently of fIXed bases;,97 Until the sea echelon is 
in place and actually assaulting the AOA, TBMD-capable amphibious power 
projection forces remain mobile, difficult to locate, and equipped for both active 
and passive defense against WMD. Once the assault begins ,  tactical and logistical 
agility are required on the part of the enemy in order to bring his WMD assets to 
bear on the AOA; more importantly, he will have to make the political decision 
to use weapons of mass destruction on an objective he is attempting to defend. 
In some circumstances, then, the JFC may wish to employ operational 
maneuver from the sea. To do so with confidence, he will require robust Navy 
Area TBMD assets . The Navy's Director for Theater Air Warfare (N 865) has 
written: "We must be able to force our way ashore even under the threat or 
actual conduct of TBM strikes.,,98 In this context, the Marines are primarily 
concerned with the threat posed by short-range systems such as FROG-series  
artillery rockets, the SS-21 mobile SRBM, and the powerful Russian-built 
SMERCH multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) . 
Roving Sands 95 demonstrated both the active defense potential of Navy 
Area systems , 99 an d the difficulty of attack operations dire cted against  the 
small, fast-moving SS-21 's TEL/oo while the challenge posed by modern 
multiple-launch rocket systems is so stressing that DoD has committed an 
advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) to address this problem. !O! 
Recent U. S.lIsraeli initiatives to accelerate development and deployment of the 
laser-based Nautilus anti-rocket defense system have shown promise. However, 
until such systems and the doctrine for their employment are proven and 
fielded, the solution to the extended-range (70km) , course-corrected, 
guided-submunition-capable SMERCH!02 probably lies with enhanced attack 
operations and will thus remain under the purview of the JFACC rather than the 
Area Air Defense Commander. SS-21 and WMD-capable MRBMs targeted on 
the amphibious objective area will remain important targets for the Navy Area 
platforms supporting the amphibious operation. 
Because of their kinematics, systems such as the SS-21 (with apogees below 
the minimum engagement altitude for SM3) are unlikely to be vulnerable to 
Navy Theater Wide defenses. These shorter range systems, however, will enter 
the SM2 Block IVA engagement envelope in the endgame. In 2008, the need for 
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defense of the AOA against both manned aircraft and cruise missiles will bolster 
the utility of the multimission SM2 Block IVA interceptor and will thus favor a 
VLS loadout of Navy Area (and strike weapons, such as the SM4) for the 
amphibious objective area support role. 
In addition to its TBMD role,  SM2 Block IVA represents a critical resource for 
the JFMCC in support of the multitude of naval missions that take place 
concurrently with TBMD. In 2008 , the Navy Area interceptor will be the 
primary AW weapon for surface combatants riding shotgun for the Cv, escorting 
MPS ships, and protecting underway replenishment groups shuttling throughout 
the theater resupplying TAG teams, MIF forces,  CVBGs and one or more ARGs. 
Indeed, this overarching need for conventional force AW protection has been a 
primary driver for the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile program, since the ESSM 
VLS 4-pack will provide enhanced self-defense for VLS platforms, while freeing 
up more launcher space for SM2/3 variants. 
Platforms, though, will still be a critical concern for the JFMCC. If the 
defende d  assets list must be protected by several TAG te ams, and an AOA h as 
to be defended by Navy Area-capable DDGs, the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander may be confronted by very hard choices regarding 
CV and URG escort--cspecially if a credible diesel submarine threat exists. A 
recent N aval  Institute Proceedings article sums up the aftermath of a hypothetical 
enemy submarine attack succinctly: "How will the naval component 
commander of the Joint Task Force explain that all of his other surfac e  ships had 
valid missions at the time, and that he had no more available for anti-submarine 
c. . " , 103 warlare protectlOn � 
While NTW may get the most visibility in its political operational-strategic 
defensive role,  Navy Area will be a key military operational-tactical enabler, 
allowing friendly forces to regain the initiative and take the offensive. The 
JFMCC's operational vision (and its associated timelines) must determine h ow 
he apportions his limited assets between these two vital categories of TBMD in 
order to provide the force protection necessary to complete his other missions 
and thus fulfill the operational intent of the Joint Force Commander. 
Rules of Engagement 
"ROE should not delineate specific tactics, should not cover restrictions on 
specific system operations, should not cover safety-related restrictions, should 
not set forth service doctrine, tactics, or procedures . . . .  ROE should never be 
'rudder orders,' and certainly should never substitute for a strategy governing the 
use of deployed forces, in a peacetime crisis or in wartime."I04 So wrote Captain J. 
56 
Theater Ballistic Missile Difense from the Sea 
Ashley Roach , JAGC, USN, in his seminal 1 9 83 article "Rules of Engagement." 
Twenty-five years later, th e TBM challenge of 2008 may force the Joint Force 
Maritime Component Commander to re evaluate his approach to rules of 
engagement as they apply to theater ballistic missile defense. 
Nature of Modern Conflict: Impact on TBM Defense. NWP 1 - 1 4M, The 
Commander's Handbook on the Law if Naval Operations, states that "US. rules of 
engagement reaffirm the right and the responsibility of the operational 
commander generally to seek out, engage and destroy enemy forces consistent 
with national objectives ,  strategy and the law of armed conflict."I05 ROE are 
shape d by op erational,  political, legal, and diplomatic forces, 106 and thus tend to 
evolve as these forces change over time. The unique operational and political 
characteristics of theater ballistic missiles will have a signal impact on the 
evolution of rules of engagement crafted to counter them. 
The ease of deployment and speed of employment associated with theater 
ballistic missiles make the transition from peace to war potentially very rapid 
when these weapons are available to an aggressor. This destabilizing alacrity was 
noted in the early days of Great Power strategic deterrence, when the first 
ICBMs figured prominently in pessimistic "Bolt from the Blue " scenarios for 
Armageddon. If theater ballistic missiles can be launched with little warning, and 
once launched can proceed to their targets at velocities measured in kilometers 
per second, then the JCS standing ROE are likely to be in effect when an initial 
TBMD response is required. To be effective, that response must be reactive , rapid, 
and robust. 
Standing ROE derive from the national right of self defense,107 but once a 
TBM leaves its TEL, national rights, international politics, and missile kinematics 
collide. The missile itself may not pose any direct threat to a U S. Navy ship 
capable of intercepting it, but in a "worst case " scenario, th e potential 
humanitarian and political impact of a single WMD warhead striking a foreign 
capital or major population center may be so great that the NCA orders a TBMD 
engagement. Is this unilateral action to be justified under a loose interpretation 
of national self-defense as an effort to protect U S. citizens or commercial 
interests in the area under attack? Perhaps, for "by the year 2000, thousands of 
US. nationals and substantial numbers of US.  military forces will be in foreign 
lands and vulnerable to potential nuclear attack by nuclear-armed regional 
states."I08 If not, though, shall the NCA then cite the inherent rights of individual 
and collective self-defense enumerated in Article 5 1  of the UN. Charter? 
These questions are rhetorical, posed to focus attention on the unique nature of 
the problem. TBMs may be launched with little or no warning. The warheads they 
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are capable of carrying imply such potent physical consequences that a single 
successful strike could lead to a political victory for an aggressor. System velocities 
are greater than any other weapon except strategic ICBMs. System ranges are such 
that TBMs may cross the sovereign territory of uninvolved third parties en route to 
their targets. The obvious and troubling corollary is that interception of these same 
weapons may thus occur over these third-party countries, raining down 
post-engagement debris, unexploded warheads, failed interceptors, and possibly 
WMD component contaminants, ranging from fissile materials to lethal chemicals 
to biologic agents and toxins. Who will the world opinion hold accountable for 
the results: the aggressor-or an unsolicited defender? 
Between now and 2008,  the United States is likely to be the only nation with 
both the technological infrastructure and financial wherewithal to be able to 
develop and deploy naval theater ballistic missile defenses with more than a local 
point-defense capability. The NCA, CINC, JFC, and Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander must carefully ponder the Pandora's box of political 
and legal issues thus opened. 
NTW capability will vastly expand the regional leverage of the JFMCC. It also 
will vastly complicate the traditional "catalytic"  employment of naval forces, 
described by Roach as overtly political tasking to "deploy units or fleets for the 
purpose of catalytic force without any clear objectives in mind . . .  in the hope 
that the Navy will do something to resolve the situation and nothing to 
aggravate it." I09 Such tasking has always lain at the heart of the "naval presence" 
mission, but the time/ speed/ distance challenges inherent in theater ballistic 
missile defense may well move the execution of that mission back toward the 
spirit of the 1 8 th and 1 9th centuries. In that era, the commanding officer of a 
warship was expected to act forcefully in the best interests of national policy as 
expressed in his sailing orders, without recourse to higher authority. In the age of 
theater ballistic missiles, as in the age of sail, that awesome responsibility may 
again devolve upon individual naval officers, who may be forced to carry out 
defensive actions that may make national policy without prior or real-time 
guidance from national leaders. 110 
Defensive Rules oj Engagement must be Permissive. True "Bolt from the Blue" 
strategic attacks are rare. If war is a continuation of politics by other means, then 
there usually is a progression of political trail blazes leading up to the point of 
open conflict. That these markers are often seen clearly only in retrospect shows 
that, while the actual attack represents merely the culmination of gradually 
increasing political hostility, the physical ability to achieve strategic surprise has 
remained constant from Pearl Harbor to Kuwait City. 
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In order to counter the capacity for strategic surprise and political leverage 
provided to regional powers by TBMs, defensive rules of engagement must be 
permissive. Despite Roach 's dictum decrying ROE system-specificity, rules of 
engagement for theater ballistic missile defense must be  shaped by the unique 
nature of the threat. The high velocities attained by TBMs and the potential 
consequences of WMD warhead use argue the need for very rapid, if not 
automatic, engagement.  Normally, the counterargument set in opposition to 
such a permissive and deadly defensive environment involves the challenge of 
de confliction, how best to prevent the possible engagement of friendly assets. 
However, the very kinematics that make TBMs such challenging targets also aid 
deconfliction.  Quite simply, unlike civilian and military aircraft, there is no such 
thing as a friendly incoming TBM. 
Furthermore,  the nature of cueing systems directed against ballistic missiles 
entails that the actual target, or most likely area of impact , becomes clear only as 
the hostile missile hurtles along its trajectory. As previously explained, 
interception is best attempted as early in that traj ectory as possible, in order to 
allow time for kill assessment and follow-on shots. Thus, the ROE-driven 
decision to engage a TBM with a Theater Wide defensive system needs to be 
made before the exact target of the hostile missile is known. The United States 
would therefore be delivering a defensive stroke without being able to articulate 
precisely what or who was being defended. Alliances, coalitions, treaties or the 
lack thereof would be rendered moot.  Clearly, the legal implications thus arising 
from the physical characteristics of offensive and defensive systems must be fully 
understood and dealt with before these defensive systems are ever deployed. 
One possible approach would be a public declaration by the United States, 
based on the same legal reasoning that guides international law regarding piracy. 
The 1 95 8  Geneva Convention on the High Seas states in part that "All states 
shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the 
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state., , 1 1 1  The 
United States could argue that it and other nations have the right to contribute 
to the maintenance of international peace and security by unilaterally engaging 
theater ballistic missiles over the high seas and over land when outside the earth's 
atmosphere (exoatmospheric NTW intercept) , for "there is no legally defmed 
boundary between the upper limit of national airspace and the lower limit of 
outer space . . .  [which] . . .  begins at the undefined upper limit of the earth's 
atmosphere and extends to infinity.,,112 Appendix B to Enclosure A of the 
current Standing Rules of Engagement for u.s.  Forces, while beyond the 
classification of this paper, is instructive in regard to this issue. 113 
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Such a permissive, unilateral national policy would have to be carefully 
couched in terms clearly deriving from the well-defined international right to 
repress acts of violence "on the high seas or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any state." Navy Theater Wide engagements would take place 
over the high seas and/or above the airspace of any nation, since this system is 
both sea-based and exoatmospheric. Serendipitously, when potential TBM 
trajectories are plotted from likely aggressors to likely targets on the current 
world scene, 70 percent of those trajectories cross international waters at some 
. 11. POlOt. 
Successful consummation of an exoatmospheric intercept harms only the 
TBM and the interceptor. The SM3 warhead itself is kinetic, with a net explosive 
weight of zero (excluding thruster fuel) . It cannot engage an airliner, bomb 
shelter, or baby-milk factory. Additionally, exoatmospheric intercept tends to 
mitigate the effects of debris on the land below, whether friendly, neutral, or 
hostile. Weapons components, toxic compounds, wreckage and errant 
interceptors will all tend to fragment, scatter, and burn up upon reentry. 
ROE issues involved with Navy Area TBMD are in some ways more easily 
resolved. The smaller defended footprint of the Navy Area system can make its 
use de facto an act of self-defense by a U.S. warship, especially when employed 
against weapons of mass destruction, which might only have to detonate in the 
vicinity of the ship in order to be potentially deadly to it and its crew. Unit 
self-defense provisions of U.S. ROE might thus suffice for initial employment of 
Navy Area systems in an emergency. Planned, coordinated use of this capability 
by the JFMCC during the course of a campaign, however, will require a degree 
of international political cooperation in the framing of specific u. s. ROE,  as with 
the deployment of ground-based area-defense Patriot units to Israel during the 
Gulf War. 
Offinsive Rules of Engagement Will Be Restrictive. TBMD active defense is a 
relatively "pure" form of warfare , a contest of sensors and projectiles that , if 
ideally successful, results in no loss of life on either side. Its rules of engagement 
can therefore be written as permutations of the universal right of unit and 
national self-defense. 
However, the in-flight interception of TBMs represents only one pillar of 
TBMD. In the course of a regional conflict ,  a strictly defensive strategy will 
almost certainly fail in the long run. Consequently, attack operations, the 
aggressive interdiction of TBMs, TELs, and their support infrastructure on the 
ground, will be a vital part of any campaign involving TBMD. Nonetheless, 
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under the purview of the ]FACC, this portion of the overall TBMD mission is 
likely to have very different rules of engagement. 
In the early stages of a regional contingency, the ]FMCC may well find himself 
dual-hatted as AADC and ]FACC, and will once again have to resolve 
fundamental operational conflicts within the TBMD mission, this time in regard 
to the ROE. The basic ROE dilemma that he will face with respect to attack 
operations is this: tactically, as AADC, he will need rapid, forceful action against 
the hostile TBM order of battle in order to decrease pressure on his limit ed active 
defense TBMD resources. Operationally, however, as ]FACC, he is likely to find 
timely execution of attack operations initially prohibited by pro scnptIve, 
circumspect guidance from the National Command Authorities. 
Consider, for illustrative purposes, that during NTF Wargame 95B, the Joint 
Force Commander: 
a. Established initial TMD ROE as the right of self-defense. 
b. Refined the ROE automatically to identifY as hostile those ballistic 
missiles: 
1 .  D etermined to originate from designated hostile nations. 
2. De termine d to impact within the defended area of USEUCOM AOR. 
3. Assesse d as part of the designated hostile nation operational order of 
battle (OOB) . 
c. Held that authorization for attack on forces of designate d hostile nations 
within the hostile nation's borders remains with the NCA.11S  
Specific rules of engagement were (in operational sequence) : 
A. The interception of a ballistic missile in self-defense (own forces within 
kill zone of impact point) is permitted.  
B. The interception of a ballistic missile, whose predicted impact is  within 
own territory or designated friendly nations, is permitted . . . .  
C. The attack on forces of a nation which has been positively identified as 
having launched ballistic missiles against own or designated friendly 
nations is permitted. 
D. The interception of a ballistic missile, whose predicted impact point is 
within the territory of third nations, is permitte d. 116 
Note that all active defense-related ROE are aligne d with the principles of 
self-defense. The NeA, however, has retained specific control of authorization 
for attack operations. This cle arly include s the use of TLAM or other strike 
assets available in the same AEGIS ships that may be tasked with the 
forward-positioned active defense NTW role. Thus, these ships are potentially 
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elements of the Joint Force, as directed by the JFC. He should prepare for the 
consequences of success.  He must plan to work himself out if a job. 
Joint TBMD Active Defense Capabilities to 2008 
The sequential nature of the events just described is in part a rhetorical 
device, emphasizing the essential "enabling" role of the naval c omponent in the 
phased execution of j oint operations. Naval forces will clearly not carry 1 00 
percent of the defensive burden until some magic moment in the campaign 
when Army, Air Force, and Marine TBMD assets are suddenly declared to be 
sufficiently robust and a time-out is called to effect transition of the main effort 
to shore-based elements. 
As explained in the C2I section of chapter III , command and control of joint 
TBMD forces is a dynamic, mutable function. The JFMCC must understand the 
capabilities of non-naval systems and be able to incorporate such systems into his 
plan as they become available, often before these assets have built up sufficient 
organic strength in theater for their particular component commanders to be 
considered for overall command of the TBMD fight . 
Several active defense systems currently under development by other 
services are likely to be operational by this study's target date of2008. All are in 
some way complementary to Navy Area and Navy Theater Wide systems. 
Some provide unique capabilities not otherwise available to the Joint Force 
Maritime Component Commander. This section will give a concise overview 
of non-naval TBMD active defense capabilities  anticipated to be available in 
2008. 
Army Active Defense. Like Navy TBMD, Army active defense will be built 
around a two-tier concept of defense-in-depth, with PAC-3 Patriot providing 
area defense and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system 
covering the upper tier. PAC-3 replaces the GEM interceptor of the final version 
of Patriot PAC-2 with the smaller hit-to-kill ERINT (extended range 
interceptor) missile. ERINT is not a unitary kinetic weapon Oike SM3) , since a 
small ring-type tungsten projectile device called a "lethality enhancer" is 
fitted. 121 Like SM3,  however, ERINT is intended to hit its target directly. Indeed, 
this new missile was selected in large measure because of its agile, hit-to-kill 
design. A multi-mach kinetic impact is one of the best nonnuclear kill 
techniques against the rugged chemical sub munition warhead, a particular 
threat that has become the designated bhe noire of TBMD cost and operational 
effectiveness analysis (COEA) lethality studies. 
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Much like Evolved Sea Sparrow's relationship to the larger, vertically 
launched SM2 series, PAC-3 ERINT is designed to use existing launchers-and 
also fits four missiles in the same size canister as a single PAC-2 GEM. Thus, lift 
requirements for Patriot formations remain unchanged and challenging-but 
each fire unit can bring to bear four times its previous complement of 
interceptors. 
The defended footprint for PAC-3 will be greater than that of PAC-2 GEM, 
primarily due to improved kinematics of the ERINT missile. PAC-2's less 
efficient command guidance and track-vi a-missile (TVM) terminal homing are 
replaced in ERINT by inertially guided flight to a predicted intercept point, 
calculated by the fire control system and programmed into the missile before 
launch, followed by active terminal homing using a K. band emitter. 1 22  As shown 
by the results of Roving Sands 95 , however, the PAC-3 footprint will still be only 
a fraction of that for Navy Area SM2 Block IVA. 
The Army's upper tier of TBMD protection will be provided by THAAD, the 
Theater High Altitude Area Defense system. The system itself is unique in the 
TBMD arena in that THAAD missiles can consummate intercepts both outside 
and inside the atmosphere. This fills a gap in the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander's naval TBMD engagement envelope. NTW is a 
strictly exoatmospheric system. As explained in chapter III , many common 
shorter range TBMs reach apogee within the upper atmosphere and are thus 
never engage able by NTW Navy area defense is limited by the kinematics and 
aerodynamic controls of the SM2 Block IVA missile to a maximum intercept 
altitude of 35km. The resulting "engagement gap" is filled by the versatile 
THAAD. 
Guided by updates from the ground-based radar, the missile uses a specially 
shielded IR seeker on a thruster-controlled kinetic kill vehicle to achieve a 
hit-to-kill intercept of its TBM target.  The inevitable engineering tradeoff for 
the versatility thus offered by endo- and exoatmospheric capability is no 
capability against the TBM ascent phase. This remains the high-leverage 
province of the Navy Theater Wide SM3 .  
Like Navy Theater Wide, THAAD has been t h e  subject o f  intense debate in 
regard to the ABM Treaty. Treaty compliance has been certified for UOES flight 
tests, but questions remain about the type and scope of cueing that future BMC4I 
architectures may provide to the highly capable , Strategic D efense 
Initiative-derived THAAD ground -based radar. l2A In 2008, any treaty-related 
restrictions on full BMC41 integration of this powerful sensor could have a 
significant effect on the overall TBMD capability of a j oint power projection 
force. 
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For the JFMCC, then, the key points of interest regarding Army active defense 
in 2008 include : 
• Capabilities and limitations of the evolved, improved Patriot P AC-3 
lower-tier system. It is still lift-intensive and not tactically mobile (does 
not travel with maneuver elements of the ground force) . 
• Highly capable upper-tier system. THAAD fills the altitude gap in the joint 
TBMD layered-defense concept. 
• THAAD lift requirements are far less challenging than those for Patriot 
PAC-3 . A THAAD battalion with 4 fire units and 288 missiles will require 
40 CS sorties, or 94 C 1 4 1  sorties. 1 25 This will be further ameliorated in 
2008 by the contributions of the C 1 7 airlifter. 
• THAAD is not a substitute for Patriot any more than NTW can replace 
Navy Area. These are complementary capabilities, and indeed, current 
Army doctrine emulates dual-capable AEGIS ships by placing THAAD and 
Patriot in mutually supporting layered enclaves .  As THAAD and Patriot 
formations begin to arrive in theater, the JFMCC must take this into 
account when configuring the ground-based coverage of an expanding 
TBMD plan . 
In ideal circumstances, the incorporation of THAAD and Patriot PAC-3 in a 
fully integrated j oint TBMD active defense plan will allow the JFMCC four 
layers of protection, with NTW positioned for ascent-phase and long-range 
midcourse intercepts, THAAD covering the upper-tier exoatmospheric and 
very-high-altitude endoatmospheric threats, Navy area defense providing robust 
capability below 3Skm, and fast ,  agile PAC-3 destroying leakers in the endgame. 
Air Force Active Defense. Both during and after DESERT STORM, significant 
U.S. Air Force contributions to theater ballistic missile defense focused on the 
critical task of attack operations and the overall enabling capability of BMC4I , 
especially TBM launch detection and defense cueing via TALON SHIELD (and 
now ALERT) . However, just as ascent phase intercept represents the highest 
leverage form of N avy Theater Wide active defense, boost phase intercept (BPI) 
is an emerging high leverage niche for Air Force active defense. 
No BPI systems are currently fielded, but one concept shows potential for 
capability by 2008 . Known as the Airborne Laser (ABL) , a modified Boeing 747 
transport will be equipped with a full TBMD BMC4I suite , an infrared tracking 
and laser ranging sensor-and a chemically fueled, weapons-grade laser firing 
through a trainable nose turret. When a TBM launch is detected and a boost 
phase engagement is ordered: 
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Inside the 747, some 300 to 600 kilometers away, a tracking laser illuminates 
the first missile . Its reflected beam measures the distance between the missile 
plume and the red hot glow of the missile nosecone. A computer aboard the 747 
determines the length of the missile body and the missile's location, course and di­
rection . . . .  Invisibly, a second, high-energy laser fires from the 747's nose, s triking 
the first missile 's body, which . . .  explodes . . . . '26 
The ABL aircraft is self-deploying, although, like AWACS, it will require 
in-theater support, including secure,  defended airfields. Additionally, refueling 
and maintenance facilities for the  chemical laser will have to  be  provided. 
However, if the system works as intended, it can potentially operate outside 
enemy national airspace, conducting pre-hostilities anti missile deterrent patrols 
much like the NTW AEGIS cruiser described in chapter I I I .  Once hostilities 
commence, the leverage of such a capable BPI system, especially against 
WMD-configured theater ballistic missiles, is unmatched by any other active 
defense capabili ty, ensuring as it does that all WMD warhead components fall 
short of their intended targets, and optionally on the territory from which they 
were launched. 
Characteristics of Air Force TBMD active defense thus of interest to the 
JFMCC in 2008 include: 
• A significant degree of uncertainty as to how much capability will actually 
exist . 
• The ABL can potentially offer a major non-naval TBMD capability to the 
JFM CC early in a conflict . If a not-too-distant air base is available for ABL 
staging, or if naval TBMD forces can secure an airfield "bastion" for ABL 
and logistics use, carrier aircraft can provide initial defensive escort for the 
laser platform and it can begin operations expeditiously. 
With a fully integrated BM C4 I architecture in place,  ABL would be not only a 
primary active defense asset but also an invaluable sensor node, providing very 
accurate cueing to both other active defense systems and attack operations 
forces. It is thus a bold gamble. For Congressional review, it must show 
impressive results, on-schedule and on-budget. If ABL works as hoped, it will 
most certainly bolst er the Air Force's "Global Reach, Global Power" 
contribution to national defense. 
Marine Corps Active Defense . As the likely leading ground element of any 
power projection operation in a littoral the ater, the Marines have specific 
requirements for organic TBMD active defense : 
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• Any such system must be relatively mobile to allow movement with 
Marine combat elements once they begin to advance from under the 
defended footprint of Navy Area TBMD ships protecting the amphibious 
obj ective area. 
• The system must have capability against those enemy weapons seen as 
most threatening to Marines, threats such as tactical aircraft and 
short-range missiles, to include SS-21 and FROG-7.  Medium and 
long-range TBM threats are not the primary concern and are generally 
considered targets for the more capable naval systerru offshore . 
With Patriot still insufficiently mobile and the HAWK-successor MEADS 
(medium extended air defense system-formerly CORPS SAM) in budgetary 
limbo, the Corps has continued its proud tradition-of-necessity of wringing 
every last ounce of value from its equipment-by modifying the venerable 
HAWK system for a limited TBMD role. Unfortunately, all HAWK missiles will 
have been retired from the active USMC inventory during 1 998 .  However, the 
Marines are incorporating an improved BMC4l capability in the form of a 
mobile air defense communications platform (ADCP) . The ADCP "receives 
TBM data from the TPS-S9 radar and from other sources:'  including 
JTIDS/LINK 1 6  and the tactical data distribution system (TDDS) . 127 JTIDS/LINK 
1 6  will thus provide connectivity with the 2008-era j oint data network, while 
TDDS receive-capability will allow receipt ofJTAGS and ALERT data. Further 
modifications are planned to the TBM-mission-unique TPS-S9 radar, modifying 
it to accept external cueing. l2B 
A TBMD area defense system for ground forces which has the true tactical 
mobility needed by the Marines will not be fielded until some permutation of 
the MEADS program gains sufficient support and funding to achieve initial 
operational capability (lOC) and succeed HAWK. 
Joint TBMD Command and Control 
Though he may have gained crucial early leverage through the adept use of 
naval TBMD systems, as a regional conflict progresses,  the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander will be able to incorporate more and more 
capabilities from other service components as the necessary systerru arrive in 
theater. He will have to integrate these systems smoothly into the overall TBMD 
plan, both to increase the vigor of that plan and to consciously move toward a 
point in the cycle of planning, coordination,  and execution where he will be 
able to turn over command of the TBMD battle to another component 
commander. For example : 
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Transition of a JFACC/ AAD C from afloat to ashore may occur when the shore 
based capability to perform these responsibilities, to include command and con­
trol of joint air operations, is established. Factors dictating such a move include air 
sortie generation exceeding JFACC afloat capabilities, the preponderance oftacti­
cal air assets shifting ashore, or the shore based facility establishing the best C41 ca­
pability to control joint air operations. 129 
The smooth transition of a major subset of a theater operation from one 
commander to another is essential. Such transitions can be planned and ordered 
in accordance with the evolution of a campaign, or a transition may be required 
due to any one of a number of the unexpected contingencies that are to be 
expected in the fog of war. Communications difficulties, death or disablement of 
key personnel, or a sudden shift in the operational or political obj ectives of a 
conflict can all require the shifting or restructuring of key command 
relationships.  
No matter how well he has done, the JFMCC must thus be prepared to hand 
off the TBMD fight. To be able to do this expeditiously, he must have planned, 
coordinated, and executed the TBMD mission from the outset in a manner that 
has been fundamentally understood by all components in the j oint force. 
Coordinating the Joint TBMD Effort. "Inherent in effective JTMD operations is 
an absolute requirement for vertical and horizontal technical and procedural 
interoperability.,,130 Chapter I clearly states that in the future, the JFMCC will 
have the technical interoperability required, through the joint planning network, 
the joint data network, and the joint composite tracking network. The hardware 
and software of a fully netted BMC41 architecture will be there for him to 
use-but people will run these systems, people will use them, and people will 
approve and execute the TBMD plans that result. Once the main effort of theater 
ballistic missile defense begins to shift away from naval systems, the greatest 
challenge facing the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will be 
people and the service cultures they represent. He must have procedural 
methods and mechanisms in place to ensure that joint TBMD planning, 
coordination, execution, and eventual transition proceed in a manner that is as 
integrated as the technical systems that support these functions. 
Common language, common procedures,  and a common approach to 
problem solving are relatively easy to impose on command and control systems. 
It is much harder to do so with the people who use those systems. 
Administratively, this is a function served by Joint Doctrine and a carefully 
codified joint planning process. Operationally, the job of coordinating the 
execution of a common plan by different systems from different service 
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components is very challenging. How this challenge will be answered in 2008 is 
not yet clear. However, present day simulations, such as NTF Wargame 95B and 
Roving Sands 95 ,  have seen two different approaches to the coordination 
problem emerge-the use of a theater missile defense advisor (TMDA), and the 
creation of a theater air defense commander (TADC).  
Theater Missile Defense Advisor, "Each intermediate command layer between 
the planner and the executor adds latency to orders and data and risks 
misinterpretation and confusion, which increases the probability of error., , !3 1 In 
attempting to bolster the joint coordination function , commanders risk striking 
a devil's bargain by adding another link to a chain of command already burdened 
with the unusually stressing timeline of the TBMD battle. In the USEUCOM 
concept used during NTF Wargame 95B, this link was added above the AADC, 
in the person of the Theater Missile Defense Advisor (TMDA) . 
"The major role of the TMDA is to plan , coordinate and deconflict TMD 
operations (passive defense , active defense, and . . .  attack operations) . . . .  The 
TMDA is responsible for unity of effort in TMD planning and will issue mission 
type orders to the AADe. . . . , , 132 While the TMDA may be a component 
commander, he is more likely to be a member of the JFC staff and is thus in effect  
an agent of the JFC directing the TBMD battle above the JFMCC (who, for the 
purposes of this study, is tasked as AADC and JFACC) . 
"A TMD command structure is usually formed by assigning available assets 
into a relationship that is consistent with the CONOPS, comfortable to the 
commander in chief (CINC) , and acceptable to the Service participants., , 133 The 
origins of the TMDA "coordination from above" approach lie in the very 
proactive effort by a CINC (USEUCOM) to answer the question "What can be 
done now to improve j oint coordination of the TBMD battle?" This CINC's 
answer has been the creation of the USEUCOM TMD cell, a cadre of TMD 
(TBMD and cruise missile defense) corporate knowledge supported by a 
deployable BMC4I node known as "TMD-in-a-box." 
This theater-unique aggregate system includes the EUCOM-deployedJTAGS, 
connectivity to current BMC4I assets such as TDDS, and the ability to use GALE, 
the generic area limitation environment .  "Taking a direct feed from the JTAGS, 
this terrain delimitation system has . . .  refine [d] [a TBM] launch p oint to less than 
500 meters in less than 60 seconds." I34 The implications for enhancing attack 
operations are obvious. 
Having thus created a very capable team, the CINC will be wont to use it . The 
intent is clearly to have a mobile coordination, command and control capability 
to support this very difficult mission at whatever level that support is most 
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needed. The step from augmentation and advice to direction via "mission type 
orders ," however, is a short one. 
A theater missile defense advisor, supported by the CINC's TMD cell and its 
associated TMD-in-a-box hardware, is clearly in a position to usurp TBMD 
command, planning, and execution functions or iginally described in chapter III 
as being under the purview of the AADC and JFACC, and thus in this study, the 
JFMCe. In large part, this concept is a response-of-necessity by a CINC who 
feels that "The lack of an effective theater missile defense is a potential 
fc h· h , , 135 war-stopper or t IS t eater. 
With a fully-netted TBMD BMC4I architecture still under development, the 
leverage provided by a trained staff cadre equipped with a unique, highly capable 
command and control node makes the TMDA concept very attractive. It takes 
care of business right now. However, in the future, with full BMC4I in place 
throughout all components, the JFC might well be able to forestall adding this 
"extra link," while keeping the TMD cell to augment the staff of whichever 
component commander is designated AADe. If that commander is the JFMCC, 
he should heed the specific mission of the cell , for it is what he must ensure 
happens when prosecuting joint TBMD-"expedite the flow of information, 
provide a dedicated focus on the JTMD mission, and provide a ' translation' node 
between disparate Service systems., , 1 36 
Theater Air Defense Commander. Alternatively, an additional coordination "link" 
can be added below the component commander level. This approach has also 
found favor with a theater CINe. USCENTCOM lessons learned from Roving 
Sands 95 read, in part: " Intra and Inter Service TBMD firing coordination is not 
yet possible in real time . . . .  Up to seven Army and Navy interceptors engaged a 
single TBM . . . .  The AADC needs to have a multi-service theater air defense 
commander to address [these] problems., , 1 37 Actually, since the proposed theater air 
defense commander (TADe) works for the AADC, this particular coordination 
enhancement adds two parallel links to the chain of command. While the TADC 
coordinates TBMD active defense for the AADC, the complementary urgent 
attack commander (UAe) coordinates TBMD attack operations for the JFACe. 
For active defense, the main job of the TADC is to "arbitrate the gray areas" 
between Service TBMD control centers with overlapping defended footprints 
or overlapping sensor coverage. Under the current architecture, these 
subordinate control centers are the Force Air Warfare Commander for naval 
TBMD, the Control and Reporting Center (CRe) for the Air Force, the 
Marines' Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOe) , and the Army's Tactical 
Operations Center (TOe) for Patriot and eventually for THAAD. 
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During Roving Sands 95,  when uncoordinated, these control centers tended 
to engage-by-default.  If a TBM was engageable by the weapon system they 
controlled, they fired. Kill rates were excellent, but interceptor expenditures 
were unsustainably high. Strict apportionment of geographic engagement zones 
reduced interceptor wastage to zero-but nine TBMs got through. 13s Clearly, 
some form of dynamic coordination is called for to ensure effective e ngagement 
of targets with an efficient use of interceptors. This is the gray area through 
which the TADC must navigate. 
Again, though, this is an ad- hoc solution to a problem that exists now, due to 
systems limitations that exist now. If additional layers of command and control,  
such as the TMDA and TADC, become part of Joint TBMD doctrine in order to 
address these limitations, then it is the responsibility of commanders and 
planners to continually evaluate the contribution of these positions as BMC41 
technology matures.  Once anointed in doctrine, levels of command and control 
tend to remain, even as their practical utility is eroded by the evolution of 
technology. The joint TBMD chain of command from CINC to shooter needs to 
be as short as possible-so long as that chain can effectively coordinate the 
disparate elements of the joint TBMD force structure into an efficient, 
synergistic whole that puts hot metal on target.  
Joint TBMD in Coalition Warfare 
The raison d 'hre for robust U.S. theater ballistic missile defense capability, to 
include forward deployed naval TBMD forces, is the defense of vital American 
interests overseas. Admiral William Owens has written: 
Sea-based theater-missile defenses, then, should be considered n ot only in military 
terms, in which their mobility and flexibility figure heavily, but in their political 
payoff. They are a prime example of the way advanced military technology with 
overseas naval forces can provide the kind of deterrence, alliance maintenance, and 
coalition building the new era calls for. D9 
As seen during the Gulf War, deterrence, alliance maintenance, and coalition 
building can be fostered by TBMD from all components. In 1 99 1 , these 
contributions came from Army Patriot and Special Forces, Navy TACAIR and 
SEALs, and Air Force AWACS,jSTARS, ScudCap, and DSP theater early warning. 
In 2008, all components will be able to contribute significantly to joint U.S. 
active defense, attack operations, passive defense, and BMC41 capabilities. 
However, as these forces build up in theater, the JFMCC must hark back to his 
own raison d '�tre--his mission in support of the Joint Force Commander's 
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operational intent. In accordance with the National Military Strategy, that 
mission, whenever possible , will be carried out in concert with those same 
alliances and coalitions that u. s. TBMD can do so much to b olster. If theater 
ballistic missile defense is an essential enabling capability to allow the Joint Force 
to carry out its mission in support of coalition obj ectives in a multinational 
(formerly "combined") operation, then coalition TBMD systems should be  
integrated to  the maximum extent possible into that c apability. In order to  do so, 
the ]FMCC and his successors as AADC and ]FACC will need a basic 
understanding of evolving foreign TBMD capabilities and the significant 
barriers to integration which will inevitably exist. 
Allied TBMD Capabilities. Again making the allusion to national systems first 
used in chapter II, the evolution of international TBMD capability is most 
vigorous in areas where environmental pressure caused by an imminent TBM 
threat is greatest. Such areas of high selective pressure include northeast Asia and 
the Middle East. 
Israel is a case in point. Surrounded by hostile regional powers since birth, it 
has developed not only its own nuclear-capable TBM force ,  but is now 
embarked on a substantial active defense program to counter the TBM-WMD 
initiatives ofIran, Syria, and Libya, and the demonstrated capabilities ofIraq. The 
indigenously developed but u.S. -supported ARROW interceptor program 
began in 1 988 and has now evolved into ACES (ARROW Continuation 
Experiments) , using the ARROW 2 missile . 140 " The U.S. , which is providing the 
maj ority of funding for ARROW, will use the results of flight trials to reduce the 
risk associated with national programs such as THAAD.,,141 
Faced by a bellicose, impoverished, unstable, TBM-capable North Korea, 
Japan may soon leverage its technological investment in the AEGIS program into 
its own substantial naval TBMD capability. "The Japanese Maritime Self Defense 
Force is indicating a growing interest in equipping their existing . . .  and planned 
. . .  AEGIS destroyers with Theater Wide capability for the defense ofJapan.,, 142 
Other nations have either expressed interest in particular aspects of U.S. 
TBMD capability or already posse ss "entry level" TBMD systems such as Patriot 
PAC-2 . NATO states will take part in the collective implementation of LINK 1 6 , 
the designated precursor of the future joint data network. Still others are 
pursuing cooperative national programs or are planning to buy newly available 
Russian active defense systems such as the S-300PMU- l GRUMBLE or SA-1 2  
GLADIATOR/GIANT family. 
The proliferation of such capabilities should be seen as a positive trend, for it 
provides a defensive means of restoring a TBM-perturbed balance of regional 
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Planning carried out to counter it must thus be comprehensive, flexible, and 
capable of execution through both joint and multinational operations. Even 
without all the facts, planning and preparation for the TBMD battle must evolve 
along with the threat, for the evolution of that threat over the next ten years is 
not in doubt-it is certain. 
TBMD and the Maritime Component Commander 
The ages-old utility of deployed naval forces rests on two simple facts: naval 
forces are versatile, and naval forces are present. No matter how great a particular 
capability may be, it is of little use to a CINC if it is not present in theater when 
needed. Assuming that the traditional nature of their employment will continue 
through 2008,  naval forces will be present, available for crisis-response orders 
from the regional CINCs. These forces are planned, programmed, and budgeted 
to receive significant TBMD capability by 2008. 
A naval officer can observe the evolution of the TBM threat ; he can track the 
national response through the planning, programming, and budgeting system; 
and he can watch how Navy TBMD systems fare in the POM (program objective 
memorandum). He should begin to look at this emerging operational challenge, 
and frame questions (when will SM2 Block IVA reach IOC?) for which he may 
get answers, and others (when will Iranian Scud chemical submunition 
warheads reach IOC?) for which he will not. The evolution of TBM-WMD 
systems presents such an unprecedented challenge that the number of questions 
on any flag officer's "I want to know" list will always exceed the available 
answers, well past 2008. 
This study has not attempted to provide answers to the maj or questions likely 
to confront the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander executing the 
TBMD mission in 2008. To do so would be intellectually presumptuous and 
factually dishonest-because the answers are not out there. Even if they were, 
the conditions bounding any given operational situation are unique and 
mutable. For a given contingency in 2008, what countries will be involved? 
What U.S. interests will be threatened? If ajoint force is committed, what will be 
the CINC's goals, and what, therefore, will be the JFC's missions and the 
resources dedicated to accomplishing them? Under what political constraints 
will the NCA, the CINC, and the JFC have to operate? 
That said, though, this study is premised on the assumption that it is 
worthwhile for the naval officer to think about this problem, to reflect upon 
what he knows and what he does not know, in order to better frame the 
decisions he may have to make eventually in a foreseeable U.S.  response to an 
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imminent threat . Rather than looking for specific answers to nebulous 
questions, this study has attempted to establish first principles-areas of 
concentration such as logistics; command, control, and intelligence; warfighting; 
and rules of engagement. The naval officer might best focus his intellect on these 
aspects of the theater ballistic missile defense problem he may face  in the future 
as naval forces under his command operate in a deterrent posture, escalate to the 
first U. S. forces  involved in a TBM-WMD regional conf1ict,  and "hold open the 
door" for the follow-on TBMD capabilities of the joint force. 
During the process of research, reflection, and preparation of Theater Ballistic 
Missile Difense from the Sea : Issues for the Maritime Component Commander, three 
themes became prominent. They are the keys to understanding what the Joint 
Force Maritime Component Commander will find of value when he is 
preparing to deploy in 2008 ; they also are the keys that any other officer in the 
chain of command who is responsible for countering the TBM-WMD threat 
must understand. These themes are : 
• The challenge of conflicting missions and limited means. 
• The reality of hard choices .  
• The fact that theater ballistic missile defense is one mission enabling many, 
rather than an end in itself. 
Conflicting Missions, Limited Means . When making his initial reckoning of 
what is known and what is unknown, the Joint Force Maritime Component 
Commander must consider the nature of the threat , the nature of the mission 
responding to it, and the operational intent of the NCA, the CINC, and the Joint 
Force Commander. The nature of the threat will determine how the JFMCC 
would wish to apportion his TBMD forces, and, given th e  limited means 
available to him, the scope of the mission will tell him whether or not he will b e  
able t o  d o  so. The operational intent o f  the national and theater-level 
commanders will indicate how much or how little freedom the JFMCC can 
expect to have in carrying out actions that support that intent. 
So, for example, if the immediate goal of the NCA centers on coalition­
building prior to contemplation of offensive operations, then TBMD efforts are 
likely to be politically driven ,  dedicated to highly visible protection of friendly 
regional population centers on the CINC's defended assets list . These actions 
will be closely controlled from above. Conversely, once the operational focus 
shifts to preparations for the offensive, the JFMCC may have more freedom of 
action-but also a far greater number of tasks to be accomplished with his 
limited maritime component assets. In addition to TBMD, his forces may be 
called upon to carry out many naval missions in theater, perhaps including sea 
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control, embargo enforcement, MPS escort , mine warfare, littoral USW, and 
finally strike and amphibious power proj ection in support of offensive 
operations. 
The overarching constraint of limited means must inform the JFMCC's every 
decision. While by no means unique to the TBMD mission, this constraint will 
be more acutely felt due to the dreadful consequences of even a single failure. A 
clear grasp of the CINC's operational intent will allow an initial triage of 
missions, what must be done now versus what can wait ; but even then the 
tyranny of numbers and the challenge of distance may force an apportionment 
of assets that is more thin than doctrine demands. Escorts may have to be pulled 
away from the carrier in order to guard the DAL. A Navy Area DDG, its SM2 
Block IVA interceptors expended, may have to transit without rearming to a 
vital TLAM launch basket when the primary Tomahawk shooter suffers an 
equipment casualty. An NTW cruiser may have to remain on-station despite 
falling more and more into a critical fuel state. This inevitable collision oflimited 
means with conflicting missions implies that while doctrine can be a guide, any 
presumptive answer will have to be scrutinized with regard to the mission and 
the particularities of the actual situation . Every decision will be a compromise, 
and every compromise implies hard choices. 
Reality of Hard Choices. The hard choices faced by the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander will involve more than mission priority and unit 
tasking. The JFMCC must understand the essential nature of the TBMD mission 
so well that he can take a vigorous and articulate stand on fundamental issues of 
command and control. With centralized planning and decentralized execution 
as his goal, he must balance the need for defensive effe ctiveness with the 
requirement for efficiency driven by his limited interceptor inventory-and 
make a choice. 
For instance, as AADC, he must decide how much of the Theater Wide 
engagement coordination function he will leave to his subordinate commanders 
and the automated BMC4I architecture, and how much he will reserve for 
himself and his staff. The process of making this hard choice must be timely, 
responsive-and iterative. The TBMD battle will be fast ,  fluid, and 
ever-changing. Thus, the ability of the JFMCC, as Area Air D efense 
Commander, to observe, orient , decide, and act must be at least as fast-and 
always ongoing. The level of engagement coordination may require fine-tuning 
from day to day, hour to hour, or even minute to minute. The JFMCC must 
appreciate this situation and be able to impose his will upon it.  
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Hard choices also imply acceptance of risk. Constrained by limited means, the 
]FMCC may be able to defer some missions. Others he will plainly and simply 
have to carry out. 
Indeed, the matter of calculated risk permeates realistic planning for TBMD, 
from logistical questions of acceptable fuel states and marginal rearming ports to 
political compromises between force protection and foreign population defense. 
Thus, if the ascent-phase NTW mission is deemed essential by the NCA, but not 
enough AEGIS ships are available to support forward-positioned TAG teams, then 
the ]FMCC may acknowledge the TAG concept-yet press on with an NTW ship 
sent in harm's way, at best with a non-AEGIS consort but perhaps, at worst, alone. 
Political factors bear directly on hard choices regarding rules of engagement. The 
]FMCC has a duty to his subordinate commanders to press for ROE that increase 
their freedom of action and decrease the risk to their ships, aircraft, and crews. He 
also has a duty up the chain of command. The ]FMCC must display the nicest 
respect for the responsibilities of senior civilian and military authorities, doing his 
utmost to understand the policies, objectives, and instructions his force is being used 
to implement, assuring that those authorities are informed to their complete 
satisfaction of any aspect of his force's operations and plans. Thus, with regard to the 
more offensive tasks ofTBMD, such as attack operations, the ]FMCC will specify the 
tactical and operational advantages thus offered, but place those concerns with due 
regard for their subordination to overall national policy. His aim must be to assure 
that the "catalytic" use of naval power truly supports national policy, helping to 
resolve conflict rather than accelerating or exacerbating it. 
Finally, when directed by the Joint Force Commander, the ]FMCC must be 
able to make the hard choice to relinquish the TBMD battle to the commander 
of another component. To do so effectively, he must have made other choices in 
preparation for the transition, beginning with a decision to plan his TBMD fight 
jointly. To the greatest extent possible, planning methods, language , and 
execution should adhere to commonly held joint standards. Otherwise, the 
TBMD battle cannot be handed off expeditiously as the fight moves inland from 
the littoral. The ]FMCC must make the hard choice early to eschew the naval 
tradition of improvisation and bring his likely relief into the process as early as 
possible, "training" him, in effect, for a seamless turnover. 
One Mission Enabling Many. The importance of that turnover from 
component to component, of the transition from afloat to ashore, is 
representative of the very essence of theater ballistic missile defense. Though this 
mission may well begin under the purview of the maritime component , it 
belongs to all components, for, like the threat which it counters, TBM D  
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transcends traditional boundaries. I t  is one mission that enables many and can 
therefore never be considered in isolation . 
The pace of current research and development ,  the maj or funding that must 
be apportioned among competing systems, and the detailed media coverage of 
defense industry developments all tend to focus the attention of officers upon 
TBMD as an end in itself It is indeed a unique mission-but it does not stand 
alone. TBMD is a tool that allows other missions to proceed toward the strategic 
objective-remembering that (to use one example) "from the point of view of 
Israeli, Saudi, or other coalition leaders and populations, any attempt to 
distinguish . . .  threats and defenses as either 'theater' or 'strategic ' is in effect to 
create a distinction without a difference., , 147 
To that end, the officer charged with TBMD planning and execution for 
any comp onent should maintain a clear operational vision .  He must see 
TBMD as an enabling mission in support of the CINC's op erational intent 
and the N CA's strategic goals. He must acknowledge it as being inherently a 
J omt nuSSlOn. 
As such, TBMD in 2008 will depend on the unifying and coordinating power 
of BMC4I . Only upon the supporting plinth of battle management command, 
control, communications, computers, and intelligence can the TBMD pillars 
postulated for the future stand. Without netted planning, netted data, and netted 
composite tracks, joint coordination and execution at the speed required for the 
TBMD battle will be impossible. 
That said , this same officer must beware of technological overconfidence. 
New systems will work, and work well-but seldom as well as engineers and 
tacticians hope. For that reason , planners and commanders must hold to the 
goal of centralized planning with decentralized execution . Such a vision will 
better survive Clausewitz's "friction," which comprehends why even the most 
reliable technological systems perform less well under the tremendous pressure 
of war. 
Of course, the pressure of war affects the performance of men as well as 
machines. What men uniquely perform is high-level reasoning and creative 
thinking; both of these decline abruptly under stress. I t  follows, then, that the 
JFM CC-and everyone in the chain of command above and below him-must 
bear this in mind as they envision operations against the threat ofWMD-armed 
ballistic missiles. Whether the commander succeeds or fails in countering that 
threat probably will be determined principally by how well he has prepared 
himself and his subordinates for so demanding a trial by combat. 
This study has been a spotting round, something to begin to get the range on 
a problem which may require many salvos in the future. If it has been at all 
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successful, that has been because it marks some of the right issues and identifies 
important questions. These issues and questions, and many others, will of course 
iequire further study. 
In a fractious world that often seems to have lost its bearings, theater ballistic 
missile defense delivered from the sea will give the United States a vital and 
flexible capability to counter the growing threat of TBMs-and the horrific 
weapons of mass destruction they can carry. For the naval officer who must 
actually sail upon that sea and personally defeat an enemy who would use such 
weapons, this great defensive capability cannot be considered in isolation-
In war, the defensive exists mainly that 
the offensive may act more freely. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan 
Naval Strategy, 1 9 1 1  
An extract and adaptation of this paper appeared in the form of an article in the Spring 1 997 
issue of the Naval War College Review. 
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